UNIFORMITY OF NA TURE 1 1 3 



which He has freely created, conserves, and rules, according to the eternal dic 

 tate of that wisdom whose work must needs be a cosmos. The explicit men 

 tion of theism, as at least a possible alternative to mechanical materialism and 

 monistic spiritualism, would have considerably enhanced the value of Mr. 

 Joseph s able treatment of the uniformity of causation. 



We pointed out already, in connexion with the principle of sufficient 

 reason (215), as well as in the preceding paragraphs, that it is a mistake in 

 method to suppose that we must justify the particular view of nature as a 

 whole, or the particular interpretation of its uniformity, on which we base 

 our inductions and inferences, before we proceed to make any of those 

 inductions or inferences. It is one thing to set out in the investigation 

 or discovery of truth by making certain assumptions, and to justify these 

 assumptions in due course : it is another thing altogether to demand an 

 ultimate justification of them before we set out at all, and as a con 

 dition for setting out. The former procedure is rational, the latter de 

 mand is irrational. While, for instance, it is undoubtedly true that unless 

 reality were intelligible, knowledge would be impossible ; it does not fol 

 low that this truth must be explicitly assumed and placed as the necessary 

 foundation and starting-point of all search for truth ; just as we saw that it is 

 not necessary to assume a knowledge of the existence of an All-wise Ruler 

 of nature before believing anything else about nature. We must start 

 by assuming these principles of sufficient reason, causality, and unifor 

 mity : they are presuppositions of induction : it is by experience in the 

 broadest sense that we afterwards justify them. 



There is an analogous assumption discussed in epistemology regarding 

 the capacity of the mind to discover truth : an intelligible reality and facul 

 ties capable of understanding it are necessary for an actual knowledge of 

 reality, but to prove beforehand that our faculties are capable does not seem 

 to be a necessary condition for arriving at such actual knowledge of reality. 

 A good stomach and wholesome food are necessary for a good digestion ; 

 but a knowledge that we have either the one or the other is by no means 

 necessary for the desired result. The sceptic has no right to prejudge the 

 question of the possibility of knowledge, or to decide it in the negative sense ; 

 but neither does it seem justifiable to prejudge it and decide it a priori in the 

 positive sense. It may not be decided a priori, but only by experience, by 

 testing our faculties, by letting them work and observing their mode of 

 operation. No doubt, it is the self-same faculty, which, by reflection, observes 

 and estimates the value of its own operations. But this involves us in no 

 circulus vitiosus ; for the philosopher s critical reflection on the spontaneous 

 workings of his own cognitive faculties does not purport to be a logical proof 

 of their soundness, but a psychological process by which he proceeds to 

 guarantee their soundness to himself, and to satisfy himself that they have 

 not been deluding him. And if the reflecting mind sees no reason to doubt 

 the validity of its own spontaneous assents, after a careful examination of 

 these, it is justified in rejecting scepticism as unreasonable. This larger 

 question, however, is not for logic, but for epistemology. 



225. RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO INDUCTION AND TO 

 DEDUCTION. Passing now to the second question raised above 

 VOL. II. 8 



