HYPOTHESIS 145 



of the inevitable requirements and difficulties of the facts, is the 

 parent of shallow minds.&quot; 



But, when we have made full allowance for the complexity of 

 phenomena, and have to choose between theories all of which 

 appear to offer equally satisfactory explanations of the latter, we 

 should certainly choose the simplest theory. And the theist, at 

 all events, will find a sufficient rational ground for doing so, not 

 in any a priori postulate that the universe must be &quot; rational&quot; or 

 &quot; intelligible,&quot; but in his own reasoned, a posteriori conviction 

 that the universe actually is the work of an All-wise God, governed 

 by His law, and reflecting His Intelligence. 



Some philosophers, evidently influenced by the impossibility of securing 

 cogent logical proof of such ultimate hypotheses as we have been considering, 

 believe that no scientific hypothesis can be proved. For instance, we find it 

 contended that &quot; a causal hypothesis is never proved in the strict sense of the 

 word. It is neither true nor false ; it is simply good or bad, useful or embar 

 rassing, as the case may be &quot;. 1 In confirmation of this view, the authority of 

 such well-known scientists as Que telet and Ostwald is invoked ; the history of 

 innumerable hypotheses that have had their day and are long since exploded, 

 is also appealed to ; and, finally, attention is directed to the formal law of the 

 hypothetical syllogism : &quot; Posito antecedente ponitur consequens ; at non e 

 converse. . . . We witness the reality only of the consequent, i.e. of the 

 phenomenon : we cannot thence conclude to the reality of the supposed ante 

 cedent. . . . Between the observed phenomena and the scientific hypothesis 

 there is a chasm that no reasoning can bridge. From the fact to the theory 

 there is a dialectic somersault that no logic can justify.&quot; 2 



No doubt, logic will not justify the inference from consequent to antecedent 

 unless we are certain that the inferred antecedent is the only one possible. 

 Can we ever be certain of this ? Yes, whenever we can exclude all possible 

 alternatives. But how can we ever be certain that the excluded alternatives 

 are exhaustive of all the possibilities (213) ? No rules of logic will help us 

 here, except indeed the general directions it lays down for observation and 

 experiment ; but, by the proper conduct of these processes, we can often arrive 

 at physical certitude that our causal hypothesis is the right one because it is 

 the only possible one. 



In regard, however, to those wider and more general hypotheses and con 

 ceptions which cannot be verified in this rigorous experimental manner, our 

 assent must be more or less provisional, although it may often prudently reach 

 that high degree of probability which is sometimes described as moral certitude. 



232. THEISM AS A VERIFIABLE HYPOTHESIS. Of course, as long as we 

 merely infer from actual phenomena the existence of an adequate cause, and 

 make no supposition or postulate whatever as to the nature of this cause, 

 beyond what the phenomena permit us to predicate about it, we are 



x Pere DE MUNNYNCK, O.P., in the Revue Neo-Scolastique, vol. vi., pp. 235 

 sqq. 



VOL. IL 10 



