146 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



obviously not employing hypothesis at all, but simply the a posteriori argu 

 ment from effect to cause. Such arguments can undoubtedly reach real 

 causes ; and they are practically the only sort of inferences we can make when 

 we push back our investigations to those wider and ultimate regions of reality 

 where analogies for hypotheses fail us. And when, finally, we contemplate 

 the phenomenal universe as a whole, when we are brought face to face with 

 what Mill has called &quot; the ultimate laws of nature (whatever they may be),&quot; J 

 and &quot; the co-existences between the ultimate properties of things those 

 properties which are the causes of all phenomena, but are not themselves 

 caused by any phenomenon, and a cause for which could only be sought by 

 ascending to the origin of all things,&quot; 2 it is not by way of hypothesis and 

 verification, but by a posteriori reasoning from effect to cause, we proceed to 

 prove that the whole phenomenal universe, being contingent, not self-explain 

 ing, must have an originating First Cause, and that this Cause must be distinct 

 from all phenomena, self-existent, and, as regards perfection, adequate to the 

 production of all phenomenal reality ex nihilo Creator, Conserver and Ruler 

 of the univeise. 3 It is mainly, at all events, by a posteriori reasoning of this 

 kind that defenders of the philosophy of theism have traditionally established 

 its fundamental thesis : the existence of an All-wise, Omnipotent Deity, really 

 distinct from the phenomenal universe, which He has created, conserves in 

 being, and rules by His providence. Now, this a posteriori reasoning com 

 bines in its premisses certain principles (like that oi causality) which are claimed 

 by those who employ them to be necessary truths, validly applicable to every 

 conceivable sphere of reality ; and certain truths of experience which are like 

 wise claimed to be accurate interpretations of experience (224). But the 

 accuracy of those interpretations, and the validity of those principles, are 

 questioned by philosophers of other schools. Hegelian idealists deny the 

 accuracy of the realist interpretation of the data of sense experience ; Kantists 

 and phenomenists furthermore question the validity and necessity of the realist s 

 principles. Hence it is that the problem of establishing the truth of the 

 philosophy of theism may be regarded as a problem of proving this latter con 

 ception of the universe to be the true conception by showing that it offers for 

 all the facts of human experience an explanation vastly superior to those of 

 empirical phenomenism, Hegelian idealism, or any other alternative that can 

 be suggested ; that the explanation offered by theism is, in fact, the only satis 

 factory philosophy of human experience as a whole. This method has, indeed, 

 been already suggested by the comparison instituted in the preceding chapter 

 (224) between the three conceptions just mentioned. It is the method we 

 employ in establishing the realist interpretation of sense experience [that there 

 exists an external, material universe, really distinct from the percipient mind] 

 against such types of idealists as Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Bain, Spencer, 



1 Logic, III., v., 6, n. i. *ibid., xii., 2. 



8 But at this point phenomenists would have us abdicate the use of our reason : 

 asking us to believe that we cannot and must not ascend &quot; to the origin of all things &quot; 

 because such source of all phenomenal reality cannot be itself a &quot;phenomenon&quot;. 

 Of course it cannot ; but is this any reason why we should doubt its reality ? The 

 things which &quot; are not themselves caused by any phenomenon &quot; must be caused by 

 something. And, since we can know about their cause whatever we are able to infer 

 from themselves, the contention of Agnosticism, that this cause is unknowable, must 

 be rejected as erroneous. 



