HYPOTHESIS 159 



by the following illustration : &quot; The war between the Thebans 

 and Phocians was a war between neighbours, and was an evil ; 

 therefore war between the Thebans and Athenians, being a war 

 between neighbours, will also be an evil &quot;. Here the major term 

 (&quot; evil &quot;) is &quot; proved &quot; of the middle term (&quot; war between neigh 

 bours &quot;) that is to say, the implicit universal principle ^ &quot; proved &quot; 

 by means of a term (&quot; war between Thebans and Phocians &quot;) 

 which resembles the minor term (&quot;war between Thebans and 

 Athenians &quot;). So that the whole process here consists in (a) an 

 enumerative induction based on the enumeration of a single in 

 stance ; and () the consequent application of the empirical 

 generalization thus reached, to a new case that is brought under 

 it, by a syllogism in the first figure : the conclusion of the latter 

 being only probable because its major premiss, the generalization, 

 is only probable. We may express the whole (as we may express 

 any argument from analogy) in a syllogism in the second figure 

 thus : &quot; This disastrous war (between the Thebans and the 

 Phocians) was a war between neighbours (P is M} ; War between 

 Thebes and Athens will be a war between neighbours (S is M) ; 

 Therefore it will (probably) be disastrous (S is /&amp;gt;)&quot;. If we 

 could cite additional instances of disastrous wars being wars 

 between neighbours, so much the better ; for it would strengthen 

 the supposition that &quot; all wars between neighbours are disastrous &quot;. 

 If, finally, we could verify this supposition and lay it down as an 

 established truth, we could substitute for the probable syllogism in 

 the second figure : &quot; P is M ; S is M ; therefore 5 is P&quot; a conclu 

 sive syllogism in the first figure &quot; M is P ; S is M ; therefore .S&quot; 

 is/&quot; . 



Hence we can understand what has been said of the relation between 

 analogy and enumerative induction : &quot; In the latter, because a number of 

 instances of a class x exhibit the attribute^, we infer that all x are^y ; in the 

 former, because two particulars a and b agree in certain respects x, we infer 

 that^y which is exhibited by a, will be exhibited by b also. In the latter, from 

 the limited extension of an attribute over a class, we infer its extension over 

 the whole class ; in the former, from a partial agreement between two in 

 dividuals in intension, we infer to a further agreement in intension. But the 

 one passes gradually into the other, for the former may be called the applica 

 tion to a particular case of a general principle inferred in the latter from a 

 larger number of instances than in the former. This is very plain in an 

 illustration which Aristotle gives of the example (his name for the argu 

 ment from analogy). A man might have inferred that Dionysius of Syracuse 

 designed to make himself tyrant, when he asked the people for a bodyguard ; 

 for Pisistratus of Athens asked for a bodyguard, and made himself tyrant 



