208 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



time as verified before they are explained. When, at length, they 

 are explained by deriving them deductively from wider laws, 

 they are called DERIVATIVE LAWS, or SCIENTIFIC LAWS, simply. 

 Thus, it is a function of science to convert empirical laws into de 

 rivative scientific laws, by connecting them deductively with more 

 universal laws of causation. 



But the &quot;explanation&quot; of these wider and more remote laws 

 of causation themselves is a matter of greater difficulty. We 

 have seen already in what a qualified sense we must understand 

 the sort of &quot; verification &quot; that can be attained when there is ques 

 tion of such laws (228-33). The law of universal gravitation, the 

 law of the conservation of energy, the first law of motion, the law 

 of biogenesis (&quot; omnis cellula ex cellula vivente &quot;), etc., are regarded 

 as &quot; verified,&quot; merely because they explain facts more satisfactorily 

 than any conceivable alternative (230), and &quot;on so wide a scale 

 that it is very unlikely that exceptions to them exist&quot;. 1 Very 

 wide laws of this kind, &quot; not yet explained&quot; 2 themselves, but veri 

 fied by their extensive power of explaining both narrower laws 

 and individual facts, are called by scientists LAWS OF NATURE 

 simply, in contradistinction to the narrower or derivative laws 3 

 just referred to. But those wider laws too call for &quot;explana 

 tion &quot;. 



The human mind is not satisfied to take these laws, whether wider or 

 narrower, as mere actual uniformities. Some logicians seem to identify laws 

 with facts ; 4 but law is something more than fact : fact is contingent, at least 

 all phenomenal or empirical fact ; 5 whereas law involves the idea of a neces 

 sity of some sort, the notion of what must be, rather than of what is. And 

 Mr. Joseph rightly says : &quot; it must not be imagined that uniformity is the 

 fundamental element in the causal connexion, but necessity or law &quot;. 6 The 

 philosophical explanation of laws that is, the sort of explanation ultimately 

 attainable by the human mind leads, therefore, inevitably to inquiries into 

 the nature of the necessity attaching to &quot;laws,&quot; &quot;necessary truths,&quot; 

 &quot; principles,&quot; and &quot;axioms &quot; ; into the ideally perfect form of scientific know 

 ledge and scientific certitude ; into the ideal conditions for &quot; scientific explana- 



1 Palaestra Logica, p. 127, 393. *ibid. 3 Cf. JOSEPH, op. cit., pp. 380-1. 



4 The Empirical school of philosophers, of which Mill is a typical representative, 

 must consistently do so. Dr. Mellone, though dissenting from this attitude, says 

 &quot; the truth is, to explain a fact, in science, comes in the last resort only to this, 

 that we show it to be part of a wider fact &quot; (op. cit., p. 319). The scientist may, per 

 haps, be satisfied with this ; the inquiring human mind certainly is not : it wants to 

 know further whether, or how far, or in what sense, every fact that is must be so. 



5 There is only one absolutely necessary fact, viz. the Necessary, Self existent 

 Being, God. Cf. RICKABY, First Principles, p. 89. 



8 op. cit., p. 376. 



