METHOD OF DISCOVERING CAUSAL LAWS 209 



tion &quot; and &quot; demonstration &quot;. Although such inquiries have been to some 

 extent anticipated in the various chapters of the present part of this volume, 

 they call for a little more explicit treatment. 



From another point of view, we may regard the attainment of certitude or 

 certain knowledge as the goal of all scientific effort ; and we may regard it as 

 the practical aim of logic to prescribe the conditions for attaining to this ideal. 

 But, in the progress which the human mind may make towards this latter, it 

 may in some matters succeed in reaching certitude ; in others it may reach 

 only opinion or probability ; and in others again it may fail altogether by falling 

 into error. A consideration of these conditions, and their causes, will, there 

 fore, form the subject-matter of the remaining portion of our general inquiry. 



WELTON, op. cit., bk. v., chaps, v., vi. and vii. JOSEPH, op. cit., chap, xx., 

 xxii. and xxvi. MILL, Logic, III., chaps, vii.-x. MELLONE, op. cit. chap. ix. 

 VENN, Empirical Logic, chap. xvii. Palaestra Logica, part iii., chaps, iii., 

 iv. and v. FOWLER, Inductive Logic, chap. iii. JOYCE, Logic, chaps, xx. 

 and xxiii. 



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