SCIENCE AND DEMONSTRATION 213 



here inclines towards one of two contradictory judgments as true, 

 but not so strongly as to exclude a prudent fear that it may be 

 false and the other true. The one to which it inclines is said to 

 be &quot;probably&quot; true. It will be equally probable with its contra 

 dictory, or more probable, or less probable, than the latter, accord 

 ing as the reasons for it are equal to, or less, or greater than, the 

 reasons for the latter. Here our assent is not fixed or stable ; it 

 is provisional. Opinion, therefore, is the provisional assent of the 

 mind to one of two contradictory judgments, with more or less fear 

 of error. When the fear is so trifling as to be practically negli 

 gible, our assent is commonly described as moral certitude. 

 When, on the other hand, our fear of error in assenting to a judg 

 ment is exceedingly great, our assent is called a mere suspicion, 

 rather than an opinion. 



When the mind is balanced, hesitating, wavering between two 

 contradictory judgments, without adhering to either of them, it is 

 said to be in &quot; doubt,&quot; or &quot; suspense &quot; : it suspends or reserves its 

 assent. Doubt, therefore, is the state of the mind suspending its 

 assent for fear of error. It is said to be a negative doubt if there 

 are no reasons on either side, positive if there are equal reasons 

 on both sides. Deliberate doubt always implies a judgment or 

 judgments about the weight of the evidence for and against ; to 

 gether with the absence of any judgment about the main matter 

 under consideration. 



The chief attitudes of the mind towards a truth, are, therefore, 

 certitude, opinion, suspicion, and doubt ; the latter indicating the 

 entire absence or suspense of assent. 



But our estimate of the grounds of our assent may possibly be erroneous : 

 we may be deceived into assenting with more or less firmness to a false judg 

 ment : and, hence, we can conceive degrees of assent varying indefinitely from 

 that of certitude or absolute adherence to the true judgment, to that of the 

 strongest adherence to its false contradictory. These two extreme states 

 of mind are, of course, contraries. The latter state firm assent to an erron 

 eous judgment has no special name other than that of error, a term which 

 primarily means the disagreement of the judgment with reality. Conversely, 

 the term truth is sometimes used to signify the subjective mental state of cer 

 tain assent to a true judgment, rather than the conformity of the latter with 

 objective reality. In these subjective meanings of the terms, truth is the 

 contrary of error. For, regarded subjectively, simply as states of the mind, 

 the state of ignotance implying, as it does, either the absence of all ideas 

 (ignorance, simply), or the absence of assent to any judgment about the 

 matter (doubt) is intermediate between the state of assent to a true judgment, 

 and that of assent to an erroneous one about the same subject-matter. 



