240 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



see intuitively that the abstract principles of logic, metaphysics, and mathematics 

 must be true absolutely, because reality as conceived in the abstract by the 

 intellect, or, in other words, the abstract, possible essences of things, are seen 

 by the intellect to involve necessarily the truth of those principles. We do not 

 see in this intuitive manner that our widest inductive generalizations such as the 

 law of gravitation, or the uniformity of nature are true in this same absolute 

 sense ; for they are not. But we see that they are, de facto, hypothetically and 

 contingently true, because our sense experience of concrete, contingent facts 

 forces us to admit their truth, and would not be explicable, or intelligible, or 

 rational, on any other hypothesis. 1 We see why we must believe them to be 

 true, namely, because the facts of our experience are what they are. But it 

 may be said that this knowledge is not explanatory : that it does not show us 

 why the laws in question must be true. And this may be admitted ; for no 

 contingent, hypothetical laws, however wide, can offer an ultimate explanation 

 of concrete facts. Laws are but the expression of the modus agendi, the 

 manner of acting, of causes or combinations of causes. And we shall not have 

 fully explained any concrete fact in the universe until we know why the agencies 

 of nature act according to those widest laws why, for example, matter gravitates, 

 or why life comes only from life, or why natural causes act uniformly. 



&quot; We may point to facts,&quot; writes Mr. Joseph, 2 &quot; from which it follows that 

 we must believe a proposition ; but we do not thereby explain the proposition, 

 It is the thing believed, and not our believing, which must be shown to follow, 

 if we are to say that we are finding an explanation.&quot; But &quot; the thing believed &quot; 

 is the proposition. And unless the proposition itself were seen by us to follow 

 from our previous interpretations of experience, neither would our belief in it 

 follow from these. We give our assent to the existential propositions em 

 bodying the facts, because we have the testimony of our senses that the facts 

 are so. And we give our assent to the laws because we see that the facts 

 involve these latter. The next question, about both facts and laws, is, Why are 

 they so ? Or, to apply the same question to one great assent underlying all 

 inductive inference : We believe that physical agencies are uniform in their 

 activities because they are uniform, but why are they uniform ? Philosophers 

 differ in their answers to this ultimate question because they differ in their 

 views as to the nature of reality as a whole. The sufficient reason which 

 satisfies all theists, why this and all facts are so the one which they consider 

 the only true reason is that the Will of God has made them so. In reaching 



1 Mr. Joseph says of logical principles that &quot; every explanation must be 

 consistent with them but they will not themselves explain anything &quot; (op. cit., p. 466). 

 But if the principles of abstract (geometrical) magnitude and number &quot; explain &quot; or 

 &quot;demonstrate&quot; the abstract conclusions derived from them in geometry and 

 mathematics, so do the principles of pure thought and being &quot; explain &quot; or &quot; demon 

 strate &quot; the abstract conclusions of logic and metaphysics. But by &quot; Explanation &quot; 

 he understands here proximate or &quot; scientific &quot; explanation, as opposed to ultimate or 

 &quot;philosophical &quot; explanation ; for he says : &quot; In all explanations, our premisses are 

 1 special or proper or scientific principles &quot; (ibid.) ; though he goes on to raise 

 distinctly ultimate or philosophical questions in discussing &quot; Explanation &quot;. In ac 

 cordance with our view of logic, as concerned not merely with &quot; scientific &quot; but also 

 with &quot; philosophical &quot; thought (202) we take the term &quot; Explanation &quot; in its fuller and 

 deeper sense. 



2 op. cit., p. 466, n. i. 



