SCIENCE AND DEMONSTRATION 243 



whole, writes Professor Welton, &quot;[the totality of the conditions of any 

 concrete phenomenon] is, in its primary meaning, that whole system. In this 

 sense an ultimate analysis is obviously impossible. . . . &quot; 



If, however, the whole physical universe and all its activities be regarded 

 as contingent, and dependent on the free creating and conserving influence of 

 a Supreme, Self-existent, Necessary Being, distinct from this universe, then, 

 obviously, our certitude about these activities and their laws cannot be necessary, 

 absolute, metaphysical, but only contingent, conditional, physical. 



Mr. Joseph 2 seems to think that all our scientific knowledge rests ulti 

 mately on certain assumptions, or &quot;maxims,&quot; or &quot;anticipations,&quot; such as our 

 &quot; notion of what a rational universe should be,&quot; and our &quot; belief that the 

 universe is rational,&quot; and our belief in the &quot; uniformity of nature,&quot; which 

 are neither self-evident nor capable of deductive explanation on the one hand, 

 nor &quot;derived from experience&quot; on the other (231). If our assent to such 

 fundamental truths, no matter by what name we call them, is thus in no way 

 rationally explicable or justifiable, the science that is based upon them ceases 

 to be rational too, inasmuch as its foundations are insoluble enigmas. But the 

 human mind has never acquiesced in any such ultimate avowal of its own 

 impotence. It claims and it is right in claiming, for it really possesses the 

 power to justify its assent to these foundations of science, by connecting them 

 rationally with the truth of God s existence. And this truth it undoubtedly 

 derives &quot; from experience &quot; that is, from experience as revealed to the senses 

 and interpreted by reason. For all facts, including the existence of God, the 

 First Fact, experience, in this full sense, is our ultimate court of appeal. 



So, too, the truth of the uniformity of nature (224) is not independent 

 of experience in the same way as mathematical axioms are ; though this seems 

 to be the way in which Mr. Joseph regards it. 3 Not only do we derive from 

 experience the concepts involved in it, as indeed he admits, 4 but the truth 

 itself, referring, as it does, not to the abstract, conceptual order merely, but to 

 the concrete, existing order of things, is grounded in, and confirmed by, ex 

 perience. Not that we can ever positively call it into doubt : to do so would 

 be as fatal as to doubt seriously the capacity of the mind to attain to truth : 

 it is one of those principles the truth of which we must postulate or assume 

 provisionally from the start : an assumption which experience justifies after 

 wards, by illustrating the success of these principles rather than by any formal 

 demonstration of them. 



258. DISCOVERY AND PROOF OF TRUTH BY INDUCTION AND BY 

 DEDUCTION. The question is sometimes asked whether logic ought to con 

 cern itself with laying down canons for the discovery of truth as well as for the 

 proof of truth (210). There can be no doubt that it ought. And as a 

 matter of fact it always does ; nor is this surprising when we remember that 

 although &quot; discovery &quot; naturally precedes &quot; proof &quot; or explanation, yet we can 

 scarcely be said to have &quot; discovered &quot; a truth fully, i.e. to have mastered it 

 mentally and made it our own, until we have connected it rationally with the 

 rest of our knowledge, and seen its relations to kindred truths, and their bearing 

 upon one another in a word, until we have &quot; explained &quot; or &quot; proved &quot; it 

 scientifically. 



l op. cit., ii., p. 119. *op. cit., p. 469. 



3 Cf. op. cit., pp. 506, 510, 511. * ibid., p. 511. 



16 * 



