SCIENCE AND DEMONSTRATION 249 



general truths (and their applications) concerning the facts or 

 phenomena exhibited in the conduct of men, considered as free 

 moral and social agents ; (2) firm belief based on the authority 

 of human testimony concerning matters of fact beyond the range 

 of personal sense experience ; (3) a very high degree of opinion, 

 practically amounting to a firm or certain assent, based on cumu 

 lative evidence. With this latter we shall deal in the following 

 chapter. 



Understood in the first sense, moral certitude is a genuinely firm 

 or certain assent to general truths established by induction. It is 

 the sort of certitude that prevails in regard to the subject-matter 

 of the ethical, social, political, and economic sciences. The laws 

 established in these sciences are based upon the undeniable exist 

 ence of uniform tendencies implanted in human nature. These 

 propensities are variously described as &quot; moral &quot; laws ; &quot; moral,&quot; 

 or &quot;human,&quot; or &quot;rational,&quot; or &quot;social&quot; &quot;instincts&quot;; &quot;natural 

 bias&quot;; &quot;inclinations of free agents,&quot; etc. 1 They are quite com 

 patible with the existence of free-will. They are only conditionally 

 necessary, i.e. their applications to particular cases hold good only 

 on the condition that in those cases man will not run counter to 

 the dictates of his rational nature as he may do, and is free to do, 

 absolutely speaking. But this foreseen contingency does not 

 diminish the firmness of our assent to these &quot; moral &quot; laws, any 

 more than* the foreseen contingency of a miracle interferes with 

 our assent to &quot; physical &quot; laws. Nor is there any reason why the 

 mere absolute possibility that a man may act &quot; unnaturally,&quot; 

 &quot; abnormally,&quot; &quot; unreasonably&quot; in a particular case, should destroy 

 our moral certitude that he will not do so, by producing in our 

 minds a &quot; prudent fear &quot; that he will ; just as the bare, absolute 

 possibility of a miracle does not destroy our physical certitude 

 about particular applications of physical laws. Provided we see 

 no special reason to expect something abnormal in a particular 

 case, we are certain that the law will apply. &quot;When we assert 

 that certitude shuts out all doubt and obviates all danger of a mis 

 take, we have reference to well-founded, prudent, rational doubts, 

 and to the danger of error truly such ; and not to unfounded, 

 foolish, irrational misgivings, and merely fantastic, imaginary perils. 

 These latter are to be scouted and disregarded, and hence cannot 

 destroy our firm adherence to the truth. As regards danger of 

 error in particular [cases] . . . danger signifies exposure to 

 1 C/. ROTHER, S.J., Certitude (St. Louis, 1911), pp. 12-17, 4O-7&amp;lt;x 



