266 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



called is an argument from likelihoods or signs : a-v\\ojiarfio&amp;lt;j e 

 iKora)v % ffrjpdwv. He defines it in the Prior Analytics, and often 

 recurs to it in the Rhetoric, calling it here the &quot; Rhetorical syllo 

 gism&quot; z for the obvious reason that it does not convince by pro 

 ducing scientific certitude, but only persuades, and is therefore 

 extensively used by the public speaker whose object is to win the 

 adherence of his audience. 



The &amp;lt;rr)/j,iov is some particular fact which is regarded as prob 

 able evidence either of some other particular fact, or of the truth 

 of some general assertion. 



For example : 



&quot; Ambitious men are liberal ; 



&quot; Pittacus is ambitious ; 



&quot; Therefore Pittacus is liberal.&quot; 



Here the ambition of Pittacus is regarded as a sign of his liberality 

 one particular fact as the sign of another. If the general prin 

 ciple &quot; Ambitious men are liberal &quot; were certainly true, ambition 

 would be no longer merely ^probable sign cnj^eLov of liberality ; 

 it would be a certain evidence Tetc/jt^piov 2 of the latter ; and the 

 syllogism would become a valid proof of fact, producing certitude ; 

 though it would not be a demonstration, or produce scientific cer 

 titude. An example of a conclusive argument from a reK^piov 

 would be : 



&quot; All such combinations of symptoms mean consumption ; 



&quot; Here we have such a combination ; 



&quot; Therefore this is a case of consumption.&quot; 3 



Where, as in the former syllogism, the general principle invoked 

 in the premisses is an et /eo?, the syllogism may also be rightly 

 regarded as an argument from a general likelihood or probability. 



The enthymemes just given are in the first figure. Here are 

 some examples of the enthymeme in the second figure, which also 

 argues from one particular fact to another as signified by the 

 former : 



&quot; Ambitious men are liberal ; 



&quot; Pittacus is liberal ; 



&quot; Therefore Pittacus is ambitious.&quot; 



1 Anal. Prior., II., xxvii. ; Rhet., I., i. and ii. Cf. JOSEPH, op. cit., p. 323 n. ; 

 KEYNES, Formal Logic, p. 322 ; MELLONE, op. cit., pp. 253-8 ; JOYCE, op. cit., 

 p. 253 ; CLARKE, Logic, pp. 356, 429. 



2 Rhet., I., ii. MELLONE op. cit., p. 258. 



