268 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



11 Socrates was just ; 



&quot; Socrates was wise ; 



&quot; Therefore the wise are just.&quot; 



Here, Socrates may be regarded as an indication or illustration 

 a a-Tjfteiov of the connexion between wisdom and justice. The 

 &quot; inductive syllogism,&quot; which suggests a universal law from an 

 enumeration of instances (207), is an enthymeme of this kind. 



The &quot; probable syllogism &quot; was called an &quot; enthymeme &quot; by Aristotle be 

 cause it proceeds from what is found by reflection ((vdv^ais ; eVtfi^eicr&u) 

 to be a general likelihood, or a symptom of the inferred conclusion. And he 

 called the same kind of argument a &quot; rhetorical syllogism &quot; because orators, 

 whose function it is to persuade rather than to convince, have frequent recourse 

 to it. The enthymeme in the modern sense of this term, might also be called 

 a &quot; rhetorical syllogism,&quot; inasmuch as it is not customary in ordinary discourse, 

 and outside formal disputation, to give expression to all the constituent judg 

 ments in a process of reasoning. It is not clear why the term enthymeme came 

 to be applied to a syllogism with a suppressed premiss or conclusion. Possibly 

 owing to a misinterpretation of Aristotle, Anal., Prior., II. xxvii. where he 

 says : &quot; If one premiss is stated we have only an [argument from an] indica 

 tion ; if the other is also stated, we have a syllogism V He does not mean 

 here to suggest that the syllogism so stated is not an enthymeme ; for it is an 

 enthymeme in Aristotle s sense whether one or both premisses are expressed. 

 In another passage Rhet., I., ii., 13 he observes that if one premiss of an 

 enthymeme be such that it is easily supplied by the hearer, there is no need to 

 state it expressly.s Those passages may account for the modern use of the 

 term. 



264. ESTIMATION OF PROBABILITY : THE CONCEPT OF 

 &quot;CHANCE&quot;. \Ve have already remarked that it is quite impos 

 sible to measure the degree of our subjective, mental assent to a 

 probable judgment, by any mathematical calculus. It is, how 

 ever, sometimes possible to apply such a calculus to the objective 

 factors themselves which point to the truth, or to the falsity, of a 

 judgment. This method of dealing with the data for probable 

 judgments may be considered here as a distinct source of these 

 latter (263). 



There are innumerable phenomena around us which happen 

 we know not how or why. We are unable, by induction or other 

 wise, to discover their causes. We do not know the laws according 

 to which they happen. Hence we have no scientific knowledge, 



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