292 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



and their possible combinations, would furnish an excellent theatre for the 

 play of &quot; chance &quot;. And any isolated and limited portion of it would illustrate 

 the theory of probability as admirably as a game of chance. The ancient 

 Greeks conceived the world as formed by a chance arrangement of atoms a 

 concursus fortuitus atomorum. Many moderns clothe the same crude con 

 ception in a more scientific and pretentious terminology. Such a mechanical 

 conception of the universe is only a prejudice. Even in the inorganic world 

 there is a great deal more than mere mechanics. &quot; As Mach puts it ; Purely 

 mechanical phenomena do not exist . . . [They] are abstractions made, either 

 intentionally or from necessity, for facilitating our comprehension of things. 

 The same thing is true of the other classes of physical phenomena. . . . The 

 view that makes mechanics the basis of the remaining branches of physics, and 

 explains all physical phenomena by mechanical ideas, is in our judgment a 

 prejudice . . . The mechanical theory of nature ... is an artificial concep 

 tion. &quot; * And, just as mechanics is inseparable from the physics of the inor 

 ganic world, so is the latter inseparable from, and inevitably influenced by, the 

 activities of the organic world animal sensation and appetition, human know 

 ledge and volition : &quot; Processes, thus, that in appearance are purely mechani 

 cal, are, in addition to their evident mechanical features, always physiological. 

 . . . The science of mechanics does not comprise the foundations, no, nor even 

 a part of the world, but only an aspect of it.&quot; a 



Besides the laws, therefore, which govern the processes of the inorganic 

 world, there are likewise laws which govern the conscious activities of the brute 

 creation, and laws that govern the free activities of man. But the mode of 

 causality is not the same in these three orders. It is not the same kind of law 

 that connects cause and effect in each. If we describe as a mechanical 

 necessity the connexion of cause and effect in a steam engine, we must find 

 another adjective for the necessity, or the law, by which a dog obeys (or disobeys) 

 his master ; for sensation and appetite make the dog something more than 

 a machine, and introduce an &quot; indeterminate &quot; element, an element of &quot; uncer 

 tainty,&quot; into our calculations. And we must find yet another conception of 

 law for the free, self-determining activity of the human will, and for the general 

 uniformity that prevails in human conduct, notwithstanding the &quot; mechanically &quot; 

 disconcerting, but very real, factor of human freedom. 



We have already shown (223) that the constancy actually observed in 

 social phenomena is not incompatible with human freedom. We may add 

 here the following eloquent passage from Quetelet, which will, perhaps, be 

 found as suggestive and instructive as it is interesting : &quot;Amongst the facts dis 

 closed in my book, the one which has given rise to most alarm is the constancy 

 of crime from year to year. By a comparison of numbers, I believed I had data 

 for inferring, as a natural consequence, that in a given country, under the 

 same conditions and influences, we might expect a repetition of the same facts, 

 a reproduction of the same crimes and the same condemnations. But how 

 was this received ? A crowd of timid people raised the cry of fatalism ! &quot; The 

 facts, nevertheless, were undeniable ; the whole thing was to interpret, to 

 understand them. &quot; Now what do the facts teach us ? This, simply, that 

 in any given State, subject to the influence of the same causes, the effects will 



1 MACH, Principles of Mechanics, pp. 495-6 ; apud WELTON, op. cit., ii., p. 209. 

 *MACH, ibid., p. 507, apud WELTON, ibid. 



