326 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



This is a violation of that canon of method which counsels us to proceed 

 step by step in the discovery of truth (203). 



Another obstacle to the attainment of truth, one that is rooted in the will 

 rather than the intellect, is the prejudice created by the habit of a long-standing 

 and cherished belief. &quot; Prout unusquisque affectus est ita judicat,&quot; says the 

 author of the Imitation of Christ : the wish is father to the thought. There 

 lurks no small danger to the cause of truth in the fear of having our habitual 

 mental attitude in any way disturbed, of being unceremoniously robbed of what 

 we have always complacently accepted for the truth. It is decidedly unpleasant 

 to have cherished beliefs rudely exploded. Habit is tyrannical, as St. Thomas 

 well observes ; 2 and requires not a little courage to break with it. Hence 

 our eagerness to accept whatever falls in with the habits we have formed, and 

 to give it an unhesitating welcome. &quot; We like to hear people talk of all things 

 in the way we have been accustomed to think of them and to hear them talked 

 about.&quot; :t 



Yet another source of failure is the absence of a disinterested love for the 

 truth. A well-known French psychologist, M. Henri Joly, has some suggestive 

 remarks on this subject : &quot; Very often,&quot; he writes, &quot; we do not find the truth 

 because we do not seek it. . . . For we do not seek the truth when we give to 

 the investigation of facts and questions a mere superficial, half-hearted attention ; 

 when pride prompts us to imagine that by a simple glance we can see well and 

 see all ; when we are too impatient for the gratification of an idle curiosity ; 

 when a hasty half-truth pleases us better than a full truth brought to light labori 

 ously ; when we stubbornly cling to an hypothesis for the sole reason that we 

 have invented it ; when we obstinately adhere to an opinion simply because we 

 committed ourselves to it in the beginning and are unwilling now to acknow 

 ledge our error ; when, finally, our estimate of things is influenced less by what 

 they are in themselves than by the way they affect our interests, our passions, 

 our sympathies, our prejudices, our likes and dislikes &quot;. 



&quot; But why do we not seek the truth f Because we do not love it suffici 

 ently. \ do not mean that we positively love its opposite, which is error ; but 

 that we are not ready to dare all, and to sacrifice all, for the sake of truth. In 

 the field of science we pitch our camps and form our parties ; we bring to all 

 our discussions a. party spirit if we are disciples, the spirit of personal vanity 

 if we speak for ourselves. We prefer new and striking hypotheses to truths 



1 Cf. ST. THOMAS, Summa TheoL, ii. ii., Q. 53, a. 3. 



2 &quot; Ea quae sunt consueta, libentius audiuntur et facilius recipiuntur. Dignum 

 enim videtur nobis, ut ita dicatur de quocunque, sicut consuevimus audire. Et si quae 

 dicantur nobis praeter ea quae consuevimus audire, non videntur similia in veritate 

 his quae consuevimus audire. Sed videntur nobis minus nota et magis extranea a 

 ratione propter hoc quod sunt inconsueta. Illud enim quod est consuetum, est nobis 

 magis notum. Cujus ratio est, quia consuetude vertitur in naturam ; unde et habitus 

 ex consuetudine generatur, qui iuclinat per modum naturae. Ex hoc autem quod 

 aliquis habet talem naturam vel talem habitum, habet proportionem determinatam 

 ad hoc vel illud. Requiritur autem ad quamlibet cognitionem determinata proportio 

 cognoscentis ad cognoscibile. Et ideo sec undum diversitatem naturarum et habituum 

 accidet diversitas circa cognitionem. . . . Sic igitur quia consuetude causal habitum 

 consimilem naturae, contingit quod ea quae sunt consueta sint notiora.&quot; ST. 

 THOMAS, In II. Met., Lect. 5. 



ibid. 



