334 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



really cover. Mere observation of an uninterrupted uniformity 

 can never of itself transform the latter into a law ; only scientific 

 inductive analysis can achieve this result. To generalize from 

 mere observed uniformity of sequence is to confound sequence with 

 consequence, and so to run the risk of setting down as causal a. con 

 nexion which may be merely casual : the fallacy already referred 

 to as post hoc, ergo propter hoc. 



The conclusion of a merely enumerative induction can never 

 be safely extended to instances that differ notably in their cir 

 cumstances from those actually observed. In the social sciences, 

 politics, and economics, most generalizations are only rough and 

 empirical ; it would therefore be a mistake to extend &quot; such a 

 generalization founded upon a survey of the social conditions of 

 any one country at any particular time to other times and other 

 peoples&quot;. 1 This might also be brought under the head of false 

 analogy. The latter fallacy, and indeed many other of the forms 

 of fallacy already examined, involve illicit generalization : which 

 is thus a rather extensive locus of fallacies. 



It may be also regarded as involved in uncritical and indis- 

 criminating appeals to men of supposed great authority in matters 

 of human science: the fallacy lying in the assumption that because 

 such men have won great fame by their writings or researches in 

 certain departments of investigation they must therefore be 

 authorities in every domain. Such procedure is certainly a vio 

 lation of scientific method ; but it might be classified as a sort 

 of undue assumption of axioms, or of positions not sufficiently 

 proved, as well as under illicit generalization. &quot; A striking ex 

 ample of this fallacy,&quot; writes Professor Welton, &quot; is found in the in 

 tellectual idolatry with which the Schoolmen regarded Aristotle.&quot; 

 But this is less than historical justice to the Schoolmen : it is really 

 true only of the mediaeval Averroistic commentators of Aristotle. 2 

 Nor need we go to the Middle Ages for examples of such 

 idolatry : the cult of Kant, of Hegel, of Darwin, in modern times, 

 would furnish fairly apt illustrations of undue deference to the 

 authority of an individual. 



It has been already observed that the whole inductive process 

 is, in the main, a process of generalization : so that all fallacies 

 incident to induction are likely to involve illicit generalization in 

 some shape or form. All the difficulties of the process of in- 



1 WELTON, op. cit., p. 273. 



3 DE WULF, History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 228, sqq., 379, sqq. 



