v MR. DARWIN S CRITICS 157 



&quot; sensible perception.&quot; Nor was it possible to 

 help the admission ; for we have as much reason 

 to ascribe to animals, as we have to attribute to 

 our fellow- men, the power, not only of perceiving 

 external objects as external, and thus practically 

 recognizing the difference between the self and the 

 not-self; but that of distinguishing between like 

 and unlike, and between simultaneous and suc 

 cessive things. When a gamekeeper goes out 

 coursing with a greyhound in leash, and a hare 

 crosses the field of vision, he becomes the subject 

 of those states of consciousness we call visual 

 sensation, and that is all he receives from without. 

 Sensation, as such, tells him nothing whatever 

 about the cause of these states of consciousness; 

 but the thinking faculty instantly goes to work 

 upon the raw material of sensation furnished to it 

 through the eye, and gives rise to a train of 

 thoughts. First comes the thought that there is 

 an object at a certain distance ; then arises 

 another thought the perception of the likeness 

 between the states of consciousness awakened by 

 this object to those presented by memory, as, on 

 some former occasion, called up by a hare ; this is 

 succeeded by another thought of the nature of an 

 emotion namely, the desire to possess the hare; 

 then follows a longer or shorter train of other 

 thoughts, which end in a volition and an act the 

 loosing of the greyhound from the leash. These 

 several thoughts are the concomitants of a process 



