169 



for no other reason;&quot; and the most beautiful 

 character to which humanity can attain, that of the 

 man who does good without thinking about it, be 

 cause he loves justice and mercy and is repelled 

 by evil, has no claim on our moral approbation. 

 The denial that a man acts morally because he does 

 not think whether he does so or not, may be put 

 upon the same footing as the denial of the title of 

 an arithmetician to the calculating boy, because he 

 did not know how he worked his sums. If man 

 kind ever generally accept and act upon Mr. 

 Mivart s axiom, they will simply become a set of 

 most unendurable prigs ; but they never have ac 

 cepted it, and I venture to hope that evolution has 

 nothing so terrible in store for the human race. 



But if an action, the motive of which is nothing 

 but affection or sympathy, may be deserving of 

 moral approbation and really good, who that has 

 ever had a dog of his own will deny that animals 

 are capable of such actions ? Mr. Mivart indeed 

 says : &quot; It may be safely affirmed, however, that 

 there is no trace in brutes of any actions simulat 

 ing morality which are not explicable by the fear 

 of punishment, by the hope of pleasure, or by per 

 sonal affection &quot; (p. 221). But it may be affirmed, 

 with equal truth, that there is no trace in men of 

 any actions which are not traceable to the same 

 motives. If a man does anything, he does it 

 either because he fears to be punished if he does 

 not do it, or because he hopes to obtain pleasure 



