i.] ON IMPROVING NATURAL KNOWLEDGE. 15 



bodied in what are called, by an unhappy metaphor, the laws of 

 Nature and to narrow the range and loosen the force of men s 

 belief in spontaneity, or in changes other than such as arise out 

 of that definite order itself. 



Whether these ideas are well or ill founded is not the question. 

 No one can deny that they exist, and have been the inevitable 

 outgrowth of the improvement of natural knowledge. And if so, 

 it cannot be doubted that they are changing the form of men s 

 most cherished and most important convictions. 



And as regards the second point the extent to which the 

 improvement of natural knowledge has remodelled and altered 

 what may be termed the intellectual ethics of men, what are 

 among the moral convictions most fondly held by barbarous and 

 semi-barbarous people. 



They are the convictions that authority is the soundest basis 

 of belief ; that merit attaches to a readiness to believe ; that the 

 doubting disposition is a bad one, and scepticism a sin ; that 

 when good authority has pronounced what is to be believed, and 

 faith has accepted it, reason has no further duty. There are 

 many excellent persons who yet hold by these principles, and it 

 is not my present business, or intention, to discuss their views. 

 All I wish to bring clearly before your minds is the unquestion 

 able fact, that the improvement of natural knowledge is effected 

 by methods which directly give the lie to all these convictions, 

 and assume the exact reverse of each to be true. 



The improver of natural knowledge absolutely refuses to 

 acknowledge authority, as such. For him, scepticism is the 

 highest of duties ; blind faith the one unpardonable sin. And 

 it cannot be otherwise, for every great advance in natural know 

 ledge has involved the absolute rejection of authority, the 

 cherishing of the keenest scepticism, the annihilation of the 

 spirit of blind faith; and the most ardent votary of science 

 holds his firmest convictions, not because the men he most 

 venerates hold them ; not because their verity is testified by 

 portents and wonders ; but because his experience teaches him 



