vii.] ON THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE. 121 



turns upon this very point of the limits of philosophical inquiry ; 

 and I cannot bring out my own views better than by contrasting 

 them with those so plainly and, in the main, fairly stated by the 

 Archbishop of York. 



But I may be permitted to make a preliminary conment upon 

 an occurrence that greatly astonished me. Applying the name of 

 the &quot; New Philosophy &quot; to that estimate of the limits of philo 

 sophical inquiry which I, in common with many other men of 

 science, hold to be just, the Archbishop opens his address by 

 identifying this &quot;New Philosophy&quot; with the Positive Philo 

 sophy of M. Comte (of whom he speaks as its &quot; founder &quot;) ; and 

 then proceeds to attack that philosopher and his doctrines 

 vigorously. 



Now, so far as I am concerned, the most reverend prelate 

 might dialectically hew M. Comte in pieces, as a modern Agag, 

 and I should not attempt to stay his hand. In so far as my 

 study of what specially characterises the Positive Philosophy has 

 led me, I find therein little or nothing of any scientific value, 

 and a great deal which is as thoroughly antagonistic to the very 

 essence of science as anything in ultramontane Catholicism. In 

 fact, M. Comte s philosophy in practice might be compendiously 

 described as Catholicism mimes Christianity. 



But what has Comtism to do with the &quot; New Philosophy,&quot; as 

 the Archbishop defines it in the following passage ? 



&quot; Let me briefly remind you of the leading principles of this new 

 philosophy. 



&quot; All knowledge is experience of facts acquired by the senses. The tra 

 ditions of older philosophies have obscured our experience by mixing with 

 it much that the senses cannot observe, and until these additions are dis 

 carded our knowledge is impure. Thus metaphysics tell us that one fact 

 which we observe is a cause, and another is the effect of that cause ; but, 

 upon a rigid analysis, we find that our senses observe nothing of cause or 

 effect : they observe, first, that one fact succeeds another, and, after some 

 opportunity, that this fact has never failed to follow that for cause and 

 effect we should substitute invariable succession An older philosophy 

 teaches us to define an object by distinguishing its essential from its acci 

 dental qualities : but experience knows nothing of essential and accidental ; 

 she sees only that certain marks attach to an object, and, after many obser 

 vations, that some of them attach invariably, whilst others may at times be 



