282 LAY SERMONS, ESSAYS, AND REVIEWS. [xiv. 



When I say that Descartes consecrated doubt, you must 

 remember that it was that sort of doubt which Goethe has 

 called &quot; the active scepticism, whose whole aim is to conquer 

 itself;&quot; 1 and not that other sort which is born of flippancy and 

 ignorance, and whose aim is only to perpetuate itself, as an 

 excuse for idleness and indifference. But it is impossible to 

 define what is meant by scientific doubt better than in 

 Descartes own words. After describing the gradual progress ol 

 his negative criticism, he tells us : 



&quot; For all that, I did not imitate the sceptics, who doubt only for doubting s 

 sake, and pretend to be always undecided ; on the contrary, my whole 

 intention was to arrive at a certainty, and to dig away the drift and the 

 sand until I reached the rock or the clay beneath.&quot; 



And further, since no man of common sense, when he pulls 

 down his house for the purpose of rebuilding it, fails to provide 

 himself with some shelter while the work is in progress; so, 

 before demolishing the spacious, if not commodious, mansion of 

 his old beliefs, Descartes thought it wise to equip himself with 

 what he calls &quot; une morale par provision,&quot; by which he resolved 

 to govern his practical life until such time as he should be 

 better instructed. The laws of this &quot;provisional self-govern 

 ment &quot; are embodied in four maxims, of which one binds our 

 philosopher to submit himself to the laws and religion in which 

 he was brought up ; another, to act, on all those occasions which 

 call for action, promptly and according to the best of his 

 judgment, and to abide, without repining, by the result : a third 

 rule is to seek happiness in limiting his desires, rather than in 

 attempting to satisfy them ; while the last is to make the search 

 after truth the business of his life. 



Thus prepared to go on living while he doubted, Descartes 

 proceeded to face his doubts like a man. One thing was clear 

 to him, he would not lie to himself would, under no penalties, 

 say, &quot; I am sure &quot; of that of which he was not sure ; but would 



1 &quot; Eine thiitige Skepsis ist die, welche unablassig bemiiht ist sich selbst 

 zu ubenvinden, und clurch geregelte Erfahrung zu einer Art von bedingter 

 Zuverlassigkeit zu gelangen.&quot; Maximen und Reflex wnen, 7 te Abtheilung. 



