xiv.] ON DESCARTES &quot;DISCOURSE.&quot; ?85 



there are two marbles, while touch asserts that there is only one. 

 Next, return the eyes to their natural position, and, having 

 crossed the forefinger and the middle finger, put the marble 

 between their tips. Then touch will declare that there are two 

 marbles, while sight says that there is only one; and touch 

 claims our belief, when we attend to it, just as imperatively as 

 sight does. 



But it may be said, the marble takes up a certain space which 

 could not be occupied, at the same time, by anything else. In 

 other words, the marble has the primary quality of matter, 

 extension. Surely this quality must be in the thing, and not 

 in our minds ? But the reply must still be ; whatever may, or 

 may not, exist in the thing, all that we can know of these 

 qualities is a state of consciousness. What we call extension is 

 a consciousness of a relation between two, or more, affections of 

 the sense of sight, or of touch. And it is wholly inconceivable 

 that what we call extension should exist independently of such 

 consciousness as our own. Whether, notwithstanding this in 

 conceivability, it does so exist, or not, is a point on which I offer 

 no opinion. 



Thus, whatever our marble may be in itself, all that we can 

 know of it is under the shape of a bundle of our own 

 consciousnesses. 



Nor is our knowledge of anything we know or feel more, or 

 less, than a knowledge of states of consciousness. And our 

 whole life is made up of such states. Some of these states we 

 refer to a cause we call &quot; self; &quot; others to a cause or causes which 

 may be comprehended under the title of &quot;not-self.&quot; But 

 neither of the existence of &quot; self,&quot; nor of that of &quot; not-self,&quot; have 

 we, or can we by any possibility have, any such unquestionable 

 and immediate certainty as we have of the states of conscious 

 ness which we consider to be their effects. They are not im 

 mediately observed facts, but results of the application of the 

 law of causation to those facts. Strictly speaking, the existence 

 of a &quot;self&quot; and of a &quot;not-self&quot; are hypotheses by which we 

 account for the facts of consciousness. They stand upon the 



