ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 147 



&quot;Foelix doctrinae prsedo, non utile mundo 

 Editus exemplum. &quot; 3 



But on the other hand, desiring, by all possible means, to 

 cultivate and establish, a free commerce between ancient 

 and modern learning, we judge it best religiously to side 

 with antiquity, and therefore to retain ancient terms, though 

 we frequently alter their sense, according to that moderate 

 and laudable usage in politics, of introducing a new state 

 of things, without changing the styles and titles of gov 

 ernment. * 



Thus then we distinguish metaphysics, as may appear 

 by what was above delivered, from primary philosophy, 6 

 which has hitherto been taken from it, making this the 

 common parent of the sciences, and that a part of natural 

 philosophy. We have assigned the common and promiscu 

 ous axioms of the sciences to primitive philosophy; and all 

 relative and accidental conditions of essences, which we call 

 transcendent, as multitude, paucity, identity, diversity, pos 

 sible, impossible, and the like, we have included in the same 

 province, with this understanding, that they be handled ac 

 cording to their effects in nature, and not logically. We 

 have referred the inquiry concerning God, unity, goodness, 

 angels, and spirits, to natural philosophy But to assign the 

 proper office of metaphysics, as contradistinguished from 

 primary philosophy, and natural theology, we must note, 

 that as physics regards the things which are wholly im 

 mersed in matter and movable, so metaphysics regards 

 what is more abstracted and fixed; that physics supposes 

 only existence, motion, and natural necessity, while meta 

 physics supposes also mind and idea. But to be more 

 express: as we have divided natural philosophy into the 

 investigation of causes, and the production of effects, and 



his royal pupil to that conquest, which the Athenians had previously attempted 

 to execute ; as affording him the satisfaction of retaliating the injuries of a de 

 parted friend, as well as an opportunity of collecting a store of natural facts on 

 which he might erect the superstructure of the physical sciences. Ed. 



3 Lucan, x. 21. 4 Tacitus, Annals, i. 



6 Concerning primary philosophy, see above. 



