ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 165 



plenty, and variety of means. Physical causes, indeed, by 

 means of new inventions, afford light and direction in a like 

 case again ; but he that understands a form knows the ulti 

 mate possibility of superinducing that nature upon all kinds 

 of matter, and is therefore the less restrained or tied down 

 in his working, either as to the basis of the matter or the 

 condition of the efficient. Solomon also describes this kind 

 of knowledge, though in a more divine manner: &quot;Non arcta- 

 buntur gressus tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum. a6 

 Thus denoting that the paths of wisdom are not liable to 

 straits and perplexities. 



The second part of metaphysics, is the inquiry of final 

 causes, which we note not as wanting, but as ill-placed; 

 these causes being usually sought in physics, not in meta 

 physics, to the great prejudice of philosophy; for the treat 

 ing of final causes in physics has driven out the inquiry of 

 physical ones, and made men rest in specious and shadowy 

 causes, without ever searching in earnest after such as 

 are real and truly physical. And this was not only done 

 by Plato, who constantly anchors upon this shore; but 

 by Aristotle, Gralen, and others, who frequently introduce 

 such causes as these: &quot;The hairs of the eyelids are for 

 a fence to the sight. 2 The bones for pillars whereon to 

 build the bodies of animals. The leaves of trees are to 

 defend the fruit from the sun and wind. The clouds are 

 designed for watering the earth, etc. All which are prop 

 erly alleged in metaphysics; but in physics are impertinent, 

 and as remoras to the ship, that hinder the sciences from 

 holding on their course of improvement, and introducing a 

 neglect of searching after physical causes. And therefore 

 the natural philosophies of Democritus and others, who 

 allow no God or mind in the frame of things, but attribute 

 the structure of the universe to infinite essays and trials of 

 nature, or what they call fate or fortune, and assigned the 

 causes of particular things to the necessity of matter without 



86 Prov. iv. 12. 26 Of. e.g. Arist. Phys. ii. 8. 



