316 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 



partly unsettled and the inquiry partly neglected; for the 

 dignity and recommendation of the good of fruition or 

 pleasure, as it is commonly called, consists either in the 

 reality or strength thereof the one being procured by 

 uniformity, and the other by variety. The one has a less 

 mixture of evil, the other a stronger and more lively im 

 pression of good: which of these is the best, is the ques 

 tion; but whether human nature be not capable of both at 

 once, has not been examined. 



As for the question, it began to be debated between 

 Socrates and a Sophist. Socrates asserted that felicity lay 

 in a constant peace and tranquillity of mind, but the Sophist 

 placed it in great appetite and great fruition. From reason 

 ing they fell to railing, when the Sophist said, the felicity 

 of Socrates was the felicity of a stock or a stone; Socrates, 

 on the other hand, said, the felicity of the Sophist was the 

 felicity of one who is always itching and always scratching. 

 And both opinions have their supporters; 8 for the school 

 even of Epicurus, which allowed that virtue greatly con 

 duced to felicity, is on the side of Socrates; and if this be 

 the case, certainly virtue is more useful in appeasing dis 

 orders than in obtaining desires. The Sophist s opinion 

 is somewhat favored by the assertion above mentioned, 

 viz. , that perfective good is superior to conservative good, 

 because every obtaining of a desire seems gradually to per 

 fect nature, which though not strictly true, yet a circular 

 motion has some appearance of a progressive one. 



As for the other point, whether human nature is not at 

 the same time capable both of tranquillity and fruition, a 

 just determination of it will render the former question un 

 necessary. And do we not often see the minds of men so 

 framed and disposed, as to be greatly affected with present 

 pleasures, and yet quietly suffer the loss of them ? Whence 

 that philosophical progression, * Use not, that you may not 

 wish ; wish not, that you may not fear, seems an indication 

 of a weak, diffident, and timorous mind. And, indeed, most 



8 Plato, G-orgias, i. 492. 



