INTRODUCTORY REMAKES. 17 



tion as a force, we could say that water could be caused to 

 flow only by gravitation, we might say abstractedly that grav 

 itation was the cause of water flowing but this we cannot 

 say ; and if we seek and examine any other example, we 

 shall find that causation is only predicable of it in the partic 

 ular case, and cannot be supported as an abstract proposition ; 

 yet this is constantly attempted. Nevertheless, in each par 

 ticular case where we speak of Cause, we habitually refer to 

 some antecedent power or force : we never see motion or any 

 change in matter take effect without regarding it as produced 

 by some previous change ; and when we cannot trace it to its 

 antecedent, we mentally refer it to one ; but whether this hab 

 it be philosophically correct is by no means-clear. In other 

 words, it seems questionable, not only whether cause and ef 

 fect are convertible terms with antecedence and sequence, but 

 whether in fact cause does precede effect, whether force does 

 precede the change in matter of which it is said to be the 

 cause. 



The actual priority of cause to effect has been doubted, 

 and their simultaneity argued with much ability. As an in 

 stance of this argument it may be said, the attraction which 

 causes iron to approach the magnet is simultaneous with and 

 ever accompanies the movement of the iron ; the movement 

 is evidence of the co-existing cause or force, but there is no 

 evidence of any interval in time between the one and the oth 

 er. On this view time would cease to be a necessary element 

 in causation ; the idea of cause, except perhaps as referred to 

 a primeval creation, would cease to exist ; and the same ar 

 guments which apply to the simultaneity of cause with effect 

 would apply to the simultaneity of Force with Motion. We 

 could not, however, even if we adopted this view, dispense 

 with the element of time in the sequence of phenomena ; the 

 effect being thus regarded as ever accompanied simultaneous 

 ly by its appropriate cause, we should still refer it to some an 

 tecedent effect ; and our reasoning as applied to the succes 

 sive production of all natural changes would be the same. 



