V IN HUMAN SOCIETY 197 



visible in those parts of the organization of a 

 deer to which it owes its ability to escape from 

 beasts of prey, there is at least equal skill 

 displayed in that bodily mechanism of the wolf 

 which enables him to track, and sooner or later 

 to bring down, the deer. Viewed under the dry 

 light of science, deer and wolf are alike admirable ; 

 and, if both were non-sentient automata, there 

 would be nothing to qualify our admiration of 

 the action of the one on the other. But the fact 

 that the deer suffers, while the wolf inflicts 

 suffering, engages our moral sympathies. We 

 should call men like the deer innocent and good, 

 men such as the wolf malignant and bad; we 

 should call those who defended the deer and 

 aided him to escape brave and compassionate, 

 and those who helped the wolf in his bloody 

 work base and cruel. Surely, if we transfer these 

 judgments to nature outside the world of man at 

 all, we must do so impartially. In that case, the 

 goodness of the right hand which helps the deer, 

 and the wickedness of the left hand which eggs 

 on the wolf, will neutralize one another : and the 

 course of nature will appear to be neither moral 

 nor immoral, but non-moral. 



This conclusion is thrust upon us by analogous 

 facts in every part of the sentient world ; yet, in 

 asmuch as it not only jars upon prevalent pre^ 

 judices, but arouses the natural dislike to that 

 which is painful, much ingenuity has been exercised 

 in devising an escape from it. 



