496 MAN A DISTINCT KINGDOM. CHAP. xxiv. 



as those of animals, nor by his powers of perception, will, 

 memory, and a certain amount of reason, nor by articulate 

 speech, which he shares with birds and some mammalia, and 

 by which they express ideas comprehended not only by 

 individuals of their own species but often by Man, nor is it 

 by the faculties of the heart, such as love and hatred, which 

 are also shared by quadrupeds and birds, but it is by some 

 thing completely foreign to the mere animal, and belonging 

 exclusively to Man, that we must establish a separate king 

 dom for him (p. 21). These distinguishing characters,' he 

 goes on to say, ( are the abstract notion of good and evil, 

 right and wrong, virtue and vice, or the moral faculty, and a 

 belief in a world beyond ours, and in certain mysterious 

 beings, or a Being of a higher nature than ours, whom we 

 ought to fear or revere ; in other words, the religious faculty.' 

 P. 23. 



By these two attributes, the moral and the religious, not 

 common to man and the brutes, M. Quatrefages proposes to 

 distinguish the human from the animal kingdom. 



But he omits to notice one essential character, which 

 Dr. Sumner, the late Archbishop of Canterbury, brought out 

 in strong relief fifty years ago in his ' Eecords of Creation.' 

 c There are writers,' he observes, ' who have taken an extra 

 ordinary pleasure in levelling the broad distinction which 

 separates Man from the Brute Creation. Misled to a false 

 conclusion by the infinite variety of Nature's productions, 

 they have described a chain of existence connecting the 

 vegetable with the animal world, and the different orders of 

 animals one with another, so as to rise by an almost imper 

 ceptible gradation from the tribe of Simise to the lowest of 

 the human race, and from these upwards to the most refined. 

 But if a comparison were to be drawn, it should be taken, 

 not from the upright form, which is by no means confined to 

 mankind, nor even from the vague term reason, which cannot 



