144 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



regard as matter ; classified in another way, they form 

 ' perspectives ' and " biographies/' which may, if a 

 suitable percipient happens to exist, form respectively 

 the sense-data of a momentary or of a total experience. 

 It is only when physical " things ' ' have been dissected 

 into series of classes of particulars, as we have done, that 

 the conflict between the point of view of physics and the 

 point of view of psychology can be overcome. This con- 

 flict, if what has been said is not mistaken, flows from 

 different methods of classification, and vanishes as soon 

 as its source is discovered. 



In favour of the theory which I have briefly outlined, 

 1 do not claim that it is certainly true. Apart from the 

 likelihood of mistakes, much of it is avowedly hypo- 

 thetical. What I do claim for the theory is that it may 

 be true, and that this is more than can be said for any 

 other theory except the closely analogous theory of 

 Leibniz. The difficulties besetting realism, the con- 

 fusions obstructing any philosophical account of physics, 

 the dilemma resulting from discrediting sense-data, 

 which yet remain the sole source of our knowledge of the 

 outer world all these are avoided by the theory which I 

 advocate. This does not prove the theory to be true, 

 since probably many other theories might be invented 

 which would have the same merits. But it does prove 

 that the theory has a better chance of being true than 

 any of its present competitors, and it suggests that what 

 can be known with certainty is likely to be discoverable 

 by taking our theory as a starting-point, and gradually 

 freeing it from all such assumptions as seem irrelevant, 

 unnecessary, or unfounded. On these grounds, I recom- 

 mend it to attention as a hypothesis and a basis for further 

 work, though not as itself a finished or adequate solution 

 of the problem with which it deals. 



