SENSE-DATA AND PHYSICS 163 



spective of which the " sensibile ' ' is a member. This is 

 the place from which the " sensibile " appears. Secondly 

 there is the place where the thing is of which the ' ' sen- 

 sibile " is a member, in other words an appearance ; this 

 is the place at which the " sensibile ' appears. The 

 " sensibile " which is a member of one perspective is 

 correlated with another perspective, namely, that which 

 is the place where the thing is of which the ' ' sensibile ' 

 is an appearance. To the psychologist the " place from 

 which " is the more interesting, and the ' sensibile ' 

 accordingly appears to him subjective and where the 

 percipient is. To the physicist the ' ' place at which ' ' is 

 the more interesting, and the ' sensibile ' accordingly 

 appears to him physical and external. The causes, limits 

 and partial justification of each of these two apparently 

 incompatible views are evident from the above duplicity 

 of places associated with a given " sensibile." 



We have seen that we can assign to a physical thing a 

 place in the perspective space. In this way different 

 parts of our body acquire positions in perspective space, 

 and therefore there is a meaning (whether true or false 

 need not much concern us) in saying that the perspective 

 to which our sense-data belong is inside our head. Since 

 our mind is correlated with the perspective to which our 

 sense-data belong, we may regard this perspective as 

 being the position of our mind in perspective space. If, 

 therefore, this perspective is, in the above defined sense, 

 inside our head, there is a good meaning for the state- 

 ment that the mind is in the head. We can now say of 

 the various appearances of a given thing that some of 

 them are nearer to the thing than others ; those are 

 nearer which belong to perspectives that are nearer to 

 " the place where the thing is." We can thus find a 

 meaning, true or false, for the statement that more is to 



