ON THE NOTION OF CAUSE 189 



the analogy with human volition which makes the con- 

 ception of cause such a fruitful source of fallacies. The 

 latter point will become clearer by the help of some 

 illustrations. For this purpose I shall consider a few 

 maxims which have played a great part in the history of 

 philosophy. 



(1) ' Cause and effect must more or less resemble each 

 other." This principle was prominent in the philosophy 

 of occasionalism, and is still by no means extinct. It is 

 still often thought, for example, that mind could not 

 have grown up in a universe which previously contained 

 nothing mental, and one ground for this belief is that 

 matter is too dissimilar from mind to have been able to 

 cause it. Or, more particularly, what are termed the 

 nobler parts of our nature are supposed to be inexplicable, 

 unless the universe always contained something at least 

 equally noble which could cause them. All such views 

 seem to depend upon assuming some unduly simplified 

 law of causality ; for, in any legitimate sense of " cause ' 

 and ' effect/ 1 science seems to show that they are 

 usually very widely dissimilar, the " cause ' being, in 

 fact, two states of the whole universe, and the " effect ' 

 some particular event. 



(2) ' Cause is analogous to volition, since there must 

 be an intelligible nexus between cause and effect." This 

 maxim is, I think, often unconsciously in the imagina- 

 tions of philosophers who would reject it when explicitly 

 stated. It is probably operative in the view we have 

 just been considering, that mind could not have resulted 

 from a purely material world. I do not profess to know 

 what is meant by " intelligible " ; it seems to mean 



' familiar to imagination." Nothing is less " intelli- 

 gible," in any other sense, than the connection between 



