206 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



of fact, there are observed uniformities in regard to 

 volitions ; thus there is some empirical evidence that 

 volitions are determined. But it would be very rash to 

 maintain that the evidence is overwhelming, and it is 

 quite possible that some volitions, as well as some other 

 things, are not determined, except in the sense in which 

 we found that everything must be determined. 



(2) But, on the other hand, the subjective sense ol 

 freedom, sometimes alleged against determinism, has no 

 bearing on the question whatever. The view that it has 

 a bearing rests upon the belief that causes compel their 

 effects, or that nature enforces obedience to its laws as 

 governments do. These are mere anthropomorphic 

 superstitions, due to assimilation of causes with volitions 

 and of natural laws with human edicts. We feel that our 

 will is not compelled, but that only means that it is not 

 other than we choose it to be. It is one of the demerits 

 of the traditional theory of causality that it has created 

 an artificial opposition between determinism and the 

 freedom of which we are introspectively conscious. 



(3) Besides the general question whether volitions are 

 determined, there is the further question whether they 

 are mechanically determined, i.e. whether they are part 

 of what was above defined as a mechanical system. This 

 is the question whether they form part of a system with 

 purely material determinants, i.e. whether there are laws 

 which, given certain material data, make all volitions 

 functions of those data. Here again, there is empirical 

 evidence up to a point, but it is not conclusive in regard 

 to all volitions. It is important to observe, however 

 that even if volitions are part of a mechanical system, 

 this by no means implies any supremacy of matter over 

 mind. It mav well be that the same system which is 



