aio MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse 

 of the relation of object and subject which constitutes 

 presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance 

 with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is 

 presented to S. But the associations and natural exten- 

 sions of the word acquaintance are different from those of 

 the word presentation. To begin with, as in most cog- 

 nitive words, it is natural to say that I am acquainted 

 with an object even at moments when it is not actually 

 before my mind, provided it has been before my mind, 

 and will be again whenever occasion arises. This is the 

 same sense in which I am said to know that 2+2=4 even 

 when I am thinking of something else. In the second 

 place, the word acquaintance is designed to emphasise, 

 more than the word presentation, the relational character 

 of the fact with which we are concerned. There is, to my 

 mind, a danger that, in speaking of presentation, we 

 may so emphasis the object as to lose sight of the sub- 

 ject. The result of this is either to lead to the view 

 that there is no subject, whence we arrive at materialism ; 

 or to lead to the view that what is presented is part of 

 the subject, whence we arrive at idealism, and should 

 arrive at solipsism but for the most desperate contortions. 

 Now I wish to preserve the dualism of subject and object 

 in my terminology, because this dualism seems to me a 

 fundamental fact concerning cognition. Hence I prefer 

 the word acquaintance, because it emphasises the need of 

 a subject which is acquainted. 



When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which 

 we are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is 

 sense-data. When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have 

 direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise. The 

 sense-datum with which I am acquainted in these cases 

 is generally, ii not always, complex. This is particularly 



