232 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



mentioned). This leads us to the view (recommended 

 also on purely logical grounds) that when we say " the 

 author of Marmion was the author of Waverley," Scott 

 himself is not a constituent of our judgment, and that 

 the judgment cannot be explained by saying that it 

 affirms identity of denotation with diversity of meaning. 

 It also, plainly, does not assert identity of meaning. 

 Such judgments, therefore, can only be analysed by 

 breaking up the descriptive phrases, introducing a vari- 

 able, and making propositional functions the ultimate 

 subjects. In fact, " the so-and-so is such-and-such " will 

 mean that " x is so-and-so and nothing else is, and x is 

 such-and-such ' is capable of truth. The analysis of 

 such judgments involves many fresh problems, but the 

 discussion of these problems is not undertaken in the 

 present paper. 



