x Fate is as hypothetical as Freedom. 193 



" bound fast in fate " ; that Freedom exists in living 

 beings only, perhaps in none but man, and dominates 

 only a small portion even of man's life. But we 

 have seen with Boussinesq that absolute determinism 

 is not universally true in mathematics, and therefore 

 need not be universally true in nature ; though it is 

 not probable that indeterminism and Freedom actually 

 enter in the way indicated by Boussinesq's reasoning. 

 We have seen with Sabatier that the variability 

 which is so remarkable in the organic world, and, 

 according to Darwin, makes possible the evolution 

 of organic forms, appears to show a sensible though 

 very minute degree of indetermination in the physio- 

 logical and formative, as well as the motor, actions of 

 living beings. And we have seen with Delboeuf that 

 the manner in which Will most probably determines 

 action, without being itself capable of exerting 

 motive power, is by determining the moment for the 

 transformation of stored -up energy in the organism 

 into active energy. 



I do not deny that all this is hypothetical. We 

 have to do with questions in which certainty demon- 

 strative certainty, at least is at present unattainable, 

 and may ever remain so. But the doctrine that 

 Mind is bound fast in the same chain of fate with 

 inorganic matter, is as hypothetical, and as incapable 

 of proof, as the doctrine of a certain limited freedom 

 of the Will. I am not now replying to those Avho 

 deny the freedom of the Will on metaphysical 

 grounds ; my argumentis directed against those only 



