194 Automatism denies CHAP. 



who deny it on grounds of physical science, and I 

 believe that on their own grounds their argument 

 may be refuted. 



The so-called scientific argument against the 

 possibility of Freedom has been stated already ; 

 namely, that Freedom is inconsistent with the 

 Conservation of Energy ; and I have stated my reply 

 to it. This, however, is not all that is to be said. 

 If it is true, as the argument implies, that no mental 

 determination can alter the direction in which 

 physical causation acts, much more is involved in 

 this than the denial of Freedom. Moral Freedom 

 was denied on metaphysical grounds before any one 

 had thought of bringing the laws of motion and force 

 into the argument ; but, if we deny it on purely 

 physical grounds, we must deny the possibility of 

 Mind being an agent at all. When we shrink from 

 pain or seek pleasure, the older Necessarianism did 

 not think of denying that the fear of pain and the 

 hope of pleasure, which are mental affections, are the 

 causes of the appropriate muscular actions. But if 

 it is true that the law of the Conservation of Energy 

 makes it impossible for any mental determination to 

 change the action of physical causation, then mental 

 determination can neither produce nor influence 

 muscular motion, and consciousness misleads us in 

 making us believe that our mental determinations 

 our desires and our fears determine our bodily 

 actions. 



To mere common sense this conclusion must 



