206 Metaphysical error. CHAP. 



such Intelligence should, in its degree, be able to 

 understand that universe. 



It is probable that this would have been always 

 seen, but for the prevalence of false metaphysical 

 views of the nature of Mind and its relation to the 

 world of matter. The necessities of thought and 

 language demand distinct names for matter and mind, 

 and for properties, functions, and actions belonging 

 to the physical and to the mental orders ; and before 

 thought had learned to correct its own errors, the 

 belief arose that where there are distinct names there 

 must be distinct things to bear the distinct names. 

 This belief in distinct substances of Body and Mind 

 (using the word substance in its primary metaphysical 

 sense) has, until our own time, been generally re- 

 garded as a necessary part of both religious and 

 philosophical orthodoxy ; but philosophy is now 

 inclined to reject it as false, and theology is begin- 

 ning to see that it has no theological value. I hope 

 to show, however, that it is far short of the truth to 

 call this doctrine unimportant ; I hope to show that 

 its disproof will remove great difficulties from the 

 way of rational philosophy and rational theology. 



The doctrine of the absolute distinction between 

 mind and matter, or what I call the metaphysical 

 conception of the nature of Mind, was, of course, 

 always confronted with the difficulty of understand- 

 ing how the mind and the body, being supposed to 

 belong to totally distinct and unlike orders of being, 

 could act on each other at all. This, however, was 



