212 John Stuart Mill on CHAP. 



scend their own sensations ; for them, the universe is 

 limited to self. But when a rudimentary mental 

 nature comes into being, and mere sensation develops 

 into the power of perception ; when from a sensa- 

 tion the animal learns to infer the existence of an 

 external object which excites the sensation, whether 

 food, or another animal by which it may itself be 

 eaten ; and when past sensations are remembered as 

 real though no longer present ; it has been brought 

 to knowledge which contains an element transcending 

 sensation, and not implied in it. 



With respect to Memory, it is not, I believe, 

 denied by any, that belief in the reality of the past, 

 and in the general trustworthiness of Memory in 

 witnessing of the past, is an ultimate fact of mental 

 nature. This is expressly admitted by John Stuart 

 Mill in his Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William 

 Hamilton. His words are, "Our belief in the 

 veracity of Memory is evidently ultimate." It is 

 curious that his admission of this truth, which is 

 evidently not only ultimate but fundamental, should 

 be made in a footnote ; and it is remarkable that 

 Mill, in the chapter where this note occurs, and 

 Bishop Butler, in the essay on Personal Identity 

 which is usually printed with his Analogy, should 

 have arrived at exactly the same conclusion, though 

 expressed in different words ; namely, that personal 

 identity, persisting through time and change, is an 

 ultimate fact, consisting in nothing but itself. And 

 yet Mill began from sensation ; he endeavoured to 



