140 



CONGKESS, UNITED STATES. 



indeed, in every respect pertinent and lawful. 

 He is not a mere occupant of the chair by the 

 courtesy or will of the Senate; he is more than 

 that; he presides not by courtesy, but by right; 

 he exercises high powers, not by the toleration 

 of a majority, but by the sanction of the Con- 

 stitution ; his official character is recognized 

 by the other branch of Congress, by the Execu- 

 tive and Judicial Departments of the Govern- 

 ment, and his official acts are good to all in- 

 tents and purposes whenever or wherever called 

 in question. 



" The framers of the Constitution well under- 

 stood that by the general parliamentary law 

 the Senate could make a temporary presiding 

 officer, who would be subject to its will and 

 pleasure. Then the significant question pre- 

 sents itself, why the provision in question ? 

 Was it mere surplusage only in affirmance of 

 the general parliamentary law ? By no rule of 

 construction can it be so construed, if it can 

 have another reasonable meaning; indeed, a 

 purpose and different meaning must be assigned, 

 if this can reasonably be done. Can this be 

 done ? It is manifest that it can. The plain 

 purpose was to provide a different officer from 

 the one allowed by the general parliamentary 

 law: one not at the will and pleasure of the 

 Senate, but one like the Vice-President, beyond 

 its arbitrary control, one free and independent, 

 one not subject to the whim of the hour, or the 

 caprice and changing intrigues of political par 

 ties. The manifest object was to provide an 

 officer as nearly independent as might be. The 

 same conservative spirit that dictated the na- 

 ture, character, form, and independence of the 

 Senate suggested the wisdom of making the 

 presiding officer of that body as free and inde- 

 pendent as possible. It was deemed unwise to 

 make an officer so dignified and important the 

 mere tool of a party or a majority, by making 

 him subject to their will and pleasure. This 

 view makes the provision of the Constitution 

 in question operative, and answers a wholesome, 

 indeed, a necessary, purpose, in view of the 

 nature and purposes of the Senate. Any other 

 makes it nonsensical and nugatory." 



Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, said : " Mr. Pres- 

 ident, I do not propose to occupy more than 

 a few moments of the time of the Senate, but 

 .1 cannot concur entirely in the views which 

 have just been expressed by the Senator from 

 North Carolina, and I desire to say in the com- 

 mencement of the remarks which I have to 

 make that I regard this not as a question ap- 

 pertaining at all to the present incumbent of 

 the chair, but as a question purely of a legal 

 character, involving the rights and powers of 

 this body. It rises above any considerations 

 of a private character, because it affects the 

 dignity and powers of the Senate itself. If it 

 were a question involving any personal rights, 

 I should take it on myself to say that so far as 

 I have observed the action of the present in- 

 cumbent of the office no man could have dis- 

 charged the duties more satisfactorily to the 



body; no one could have acted with greater 

 courtesy and urbanity to all ; and he has dis- 

 played an impartiality and ability that entitle 

 him to the regard and consideration of every 

 member of the Senate. 



"But, sir, it is not a question affecting pri- 

 vate rights, but a question involving, as I before 

 said, the rights of the Senate tie right of this 

 body to change at its pleasure the presiding 

 officer of the body. 



" The only provision in the Constitution 

 which refers to it is found in the fifth clause 

 of the third section of the first article, which 

 was quoted by the Senator from North Caro- 

 lina. The Senator infers, from the fact that 

 there is a specific authority given to elect a 

 President pro tempore, that the Speaker pro 

 tempore is named, that it was intended thereby 

 that he was to be distinguished from other of- 

 ficers in respect to the tenure of his office and 

 the power and authority of the Senate over 

 such officer. I dissent from that view. The 

 reason why he is specifically named in that 

 clause is very apparent from the face of the 

 clause of the Constitution referred to. 



" The Constitution had provided in the pre- 

 ceding clause for the Senate a presiding officer, 

 the Vice-President of the United States; and 

 unless there had been a special provision of 

 the Constitution as to who should preside over 

 this body in the absence of the Vice-President 

 there would have been no authority whatever 

 in the Senate of the United States to choose 

 its presiding officer. I hold that but for the 

 provision here inserted in the Constitution the 

 death or absence of the Vice-President would 

 have left this body entirely without a presiding 

 officer, and incapable from any inherent power 

 in the Senate as a deliberative body to provide 

 one. It would have been in the precise con- 

 dition that the House of Commons in England 

 is, which to-day cannot elect a Speaker pro 

 tempore except by the consent and approval of 

 the crown. And so, but for this special pro- 

 vision authorizing the Senate of the United 

 States to provide a President pro tempore in 

 case of the death or absence of the Vice-Presi- 

 dent, this body would have had no power to 

 select its own presiding officer; and hence it is 

 that that clause is specifically inserted delegat- 

 ing authority to the Senate in case of the ab- 

 sence or death of the Vice-President, or when 

 he shall exercise the office of President of the 

 United States, to provide a presiding officer. 

 For this reason he is specifically named in the 

 Constitution, while the ' other officers ' are net 

 named. 



" Now, I differ from the conclusions of the 

 honorable Senator as to the results which 

 would follow provided the Senate had not the 

 power to choose. I cannot concur in the view 

 entertained by some, that when we have once 

 elected a President pro tempore we have ex- 

 hausted the power which is conferred by the 

 provision of the Constitution authorizing the 

 selection of a President pro tempore. If that 



