CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



141 





H correct, what is the consequence? 

 if your President pro tempore should 

 a have no inherent powr to seloet a 

 -M>r to him, and you have no authority 

 in tin' t 'oii-tit nt ii. M, and you see at onco that 

 the consequence would bo that the business of 

 - -nate must Btop. Or, to traoo that doc- 

 trine out to its logical consequences : suppose 

 you elect a President pro tempore and ho fails 

 to ilis -Inn-go the functions of his office it is 

 not prol>:ihle that he would do so, but it is 

 within tlu' possibilities suppose he should re- 

 t'n-i to receive any commimication from the 

 of Representatives; suppose he should 

 to receive any message from the Presi- 

 dent of the United States ; suppose ho should 

 refuse to sign the bills that were passed by 

 Congress, you have no power of removal by 

 electing another President pro tempore to super- 

 sede him, beoaus3 according to this doctrine, 

 having executed the power granted, the power 

 is exhausted and you can go no further." 



Mr. Morrimon : " I beg to interrupt ray 

 friend. He misapprehends my position entire- 

 ly. I said that the Sonata had power to re- 

 move him for cause lawful cause. The case 

 put would be a oas3 whore there would be 

 cause. I maintain that his offics as Senator 

 while he is a member of the Senate remains in- 

 tact, and for any act that ho might commit lie 

 might be dealt with as a Senator though he be 

 the presiding officer." 



Mr. Saulsbury : " My answer to that is that, 

 s > fur as I read the Constitution, it was not 

 absolutely necessary that the Senate should 

 have chosen a President from its own body. 

 Tlu-re may be a provision of law to that ef- 

 fect somewhere, but the Constitution is silent 

 aj to who may be chosen. It distinctly says 

 that the Senate may choose a President pro 

 tempore ; but it does not say that it shall select 

 him out of its own body. Suppose the Presi- 

 dent pro tempore should not be also a Senator, 

 how, then, would you reach him for failure to 

 perform the duties of his office? But suppose 

 it to be true that there is a provision which 

 requires that the President pro tempore shall 

 be selected fro:n among the Senators; suppose 

 that the Senator presiding as President pro 

 tempore should discharge every duty incumbent 

 on lii:u as a Senator ; suppose he votes and dis- 

 charges his duties as a Senator, but fails to dis- 

 rh:ir_rj! his duties as President pro tempore, how 

 would you reach him ? The only manner in 

 which you could affect him, according to the 

 doctrine that I think is here contended for, is 

 by liis removal from this body as a Senator, by 

 expelling him, and in that way reaching him as 



iilent/>ro tempore. 



" Well, sir, if ho had discharged his duties 

 faithfully as a Senator, conducted himself with 

 perfect propriety, performed the duties and 

 functions pertaining to his office as a Senator, 

 not how you are to reach him, because it 

 is not to be presumed that the Senate would 

 aot unjustly, and for the purpose of removing 



a President pro tempore, whose office is entire- 

 ly distinct and separate from lib office as Sen- 

 ator. It ia not to be supposed that in order to 

 reach him in that capacity you would be unjust 

 and turn him out of the Senate if be had dis- 

 charged his duties as a Senator ; for let it bo 

 observed that the function of his office as Pres- 

 ident pro tempore is not a function pertaining 

 to his office as a Senator of the State he rep- 

 resents." 



Mr. Merrimon : " I will interrupt my friend 

 a moment to explain further my dissent from 

 that view, and will do it in aid of the view I 

 submitted a while ago. I insist that a part of 

 the duty of a Senator under the Constitution 

 is that if he shall be designated by the Senato 

 to preside as President pro tempore he shall so 

 act ; it is one of the duties that devolve upon 

 him as a Senator, and therefore, if any Senator 

 on this floor were designated to-day to preside 

 in the chair, and should obstinately refuse to 

 do it, that would bo ground for dealing with 

 him as a Senator. The Constitution devolves 

 the obligation on him to discharge that duty a- 

 much as any other, if the Senate shall assign it 

 to him." 



Mr. Saulsbury ; " I differ entirely from the 

 view of the Senator from North Carolina. I 

 was proceeding to say that you have no power, 

 according to the argument of the Senator, 

 traced to its logical results, to reach him for 

 any cause whatever ; for, according to his argu- 

 ment, the Senate having exercised the grant 

 of power contained in the Constitution to 

 choose a President pro tempore, your power 

 becomes exhausted, and you cannot again ex- 

 ercise that power in any respect. 



" But let us trace this still further in its con- 

 sequences. He is an officer of the Senate. He 

 is not a civil officer ; and for the proper dis- 

 charge of his duties you cannot reach him ex- 

 cept as an officer of the Senate. You cannot 

 reach him by impeachment. The House of 

 Representatives has no right to prefer articles 

 of impeachment against a Senator, and you 

 cannot try him, therefore, upon any articles 

 of impeachment. He is, therefore, not a civil 

 officer of the Government in the ordinary and 

 usual acceptation of that term, but his office is 

 one purely as an officer of the Senate, elected 

 by its votes, exercising his functions alone for 

 the orderly transaction of the business of the 

 Senate, responsible to the Senate, removable 

 at the will and pleasure of the Senate. Being 

 an officer of the Senate alone, bis relation to 

 the Senate differs from that of the other offi- 

 cers of this body only in its greater dignity 

 and the nature of the duties it enjoins. 



"Now, sir, in submitting these remarks, 

 which have been very hastily thrown out, and 

 I am sure are very crude, I only want to main- 

 tain and uphold the authority of the body, so 

 that, when it shall have either an inefficient 

 officer, or one who fails to discharge properly 

 the function of his office in the chair, the power 

 may bo asserted in this body to provide an- 



