CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



147 



(which I have brought in for any gentleman to 

 rr:il if lie likes), whether the assent of the 

 In- ii, c ^>ary to a removal by the Presi- 

 tl.-nt >t' an otlieer appointed under the Consti- 

 tution, all parties a:_ r rce, and it is clear law, 

 that the appointing power, the whole body of 

 tin- appointing power, lias the clear right to 

 remove at its pleasure any officer appointed 

 un l--r the Constitution whose term of office is 

 not fixed by it. The Constitution confessedly 

 d.K * not fix the term, by any definite language 

 of any sort, during which this officer shall ex- 

 ercise his functions. It does not say that he 

 shall hold until the end of the term of the Vice- 

 President who is exercising the office of Presi- 

 dent of the United States, or that he shall hold 

 until the Vice-President returns. It says he 

 shall hold 'pro tempered Now, it is said to bo 

 open to doubt whether 'pro tempore' 1 means for 

 the time being or for some future time to bo 

 determined by some subsequent event; but in 

 any ens?, as the Constitution has not defined 

 how long this officer shall hold, the law is clear, 

 as with every other officer of the United States 

 \vln -so term is not fixed, that the power of ap- 

 pointment includes the power of removal and 

 change. When, therefore, the Senate of the 

 United States has power to appoint a President 

 pro tempore and other officers, as the commit- 

 tee so well state in their report, there is carried 

 in that grant of power also the right to change 

 those officers at pleasure. So it appears clear 

 to me that this third resolution declares a plain 

 principle of law, which is binding upon us, and 

 which it is our duty for the benefit of the future 

 to declare." 



Mr. Wallace, of Pennsylvania, said: "Will 

 the Senator from Vermont permit me to ask 

 him whether this resolution would cover the 

 case of the devolving of the presidency of the 

 United States on the incumbent of the chair, 

 the President of the Senate pro tempore? In 

 other words, does he hold that the Senate would 

 have the power to change the President pro 

 tempore of the Senate after the presidency of 

 the I'nited States had been cast upon him by 

 the operation of the act of 1792?" 



Mr. Edmunds: "This resolution does not 

 refer to that question at all. We are merely 

 asserting the general power of the Senate. 

 Whether the Senate would have power to 

 change its President pro tempore after he by 

 law should be required to perform the duties 

 of President of the United States is of course 

 entirely another question. If it is of any ad- 

 vantage to my friend from Pennsylvania to 

 know my opinion, although it is entirely out- 

 side of this debate, I will state it frankly. I 

 think the power of the Senate over its Presi- 

 dent pro tempore, which exists in the nature 

 of its own body and under the Constitution, 

 cannot be cut short by any act of Congress 

 whatever." 



Mr. Morton, of Indiana, said: "Mr. Presi- 

 dent, until this question was brought before 

 committee I had never heard a suggestion 



from any source that the President pro tempore 

 of the Senate was not removable at the pleas- 

 ure of the Senate. I have no doubt that the 

 reason for saying anything about the Senate 

 having power to elect a President pro tempore 

 grew out of the clause suggested by the Sena- 

 tor from Vermont (Mr. Edmunds). The fourth 

 clause of the third section of the first article 

 says : 



The V ice-President of the United States shall be 

 President of the Senate, but shall have no vote un- 

 less they be equally divided. 



" Now, to rebut the presumption that he was 

 the only President of the Senate, and that the 

 Senate could not hold a session in his absence, 

 the next clause provides that in his absence the 

 Senate may elect a President pro tempore. 

 When the Vice-President is absent the Senate 

 is then on the same footing with every other 

 deliberative body ; that is, it has the power to 

 elect its own presiding officer. The Constitu- 

 tion makes the Vice-President ex officio the 

 President of the Senate. The Senate has no 

 control over him except by impeachment, ar- 

 ticles being preferred by the House of Repre- 

 sentatives. That is an arbitrary provision, not 

 common to most deliberative bodies. Then, 

 to rebut any presumption that in the absence 

 of the Vice-President the Senate could not 

 hold a session, but must wait until he came 

 back, it provides that the Senate may elect a 

 President pro tempore. In other words, it 

 simply puts the Senate then on the footing of 

 other deliberative bodies that elect their own 

 presiding officer. 



" What is the law in regard to deliberative 

 bodies that elect their own presiding officer ? 

 The general law established by parliamentary 

 usage, not only in England, but in this coun- 

 try, and every other country in State Legisla- 

 tures, in city councils, whatever may be the 

 grade or character of the presiding officer, or 

 of the body, is that in the absence of any pro- 

 vision giving to them another person as a pre- 

 siding officer they may elect their own presid- 

 ing officer, and remove him at pleasure. The 

 common parliamentary law is that a presiding 

 officer elected by the body itself holds at the 

 pleasure of the body. I will read from Cush- 

 ing's ' Treatise on Parliamentary Law : ' 



It is essential, also, to the (satisfactory discharge 

 of the duties of a presiding officer, that he should 

 possess the confidence of the body over which he 

 presides, in the highest practicable degree. It is 

 apparently for the purpose of securing this necessary 

 confidence that the presiding officer is required to be 

 chosen by the assembly itself, and by an absolute 

 majority of votes ; thnt he is removable by the as- 

 sembly at its pleasure ; and that he is excluded from 

 all participation in the proceedings as a member. 

 Each of these particulars requires to be briefly con- 

 sidered. 



" Again : 



The presiding officer, being freely elected by the 

 members, by reason of the confidence whioh they 

 have in him, is removable by them, at their pleasure, 

 in the same manner, whenever he becomes perma- 

 nently unable, by reason of sickness or otherwise 



