AFGHANISTAN". 



5 



on the tribes which had attended the embassy, 

 with an undertaking not to molest them here- 

 after ; and to notify him that, unless a clear 

 and satisfactory reply was received from him 

 by the 20th of November, his intentions would 

 be considered hostile and he would be treated 

 as a declared enemy. The dispatch of Lord 

 Oranbrook containing these instructions em- 

 bodied a review of the transactions of the 

 British Government with Shere Ali since his 

 accession, and of its endeavors to secure the 

 integrity of his territory. The object of the 

 British Government during the whole series 

 of years had been, it said, to establish on its 

 northwestern border " a strong, friendly, and 

 independent state with interests in unison with 

 those of the Indian Government, ready to act in 

 certain eventualities as an auxiliary in the pro- 

 tection of the frontier from intrigue or aggres- 

 sion." Until the time that an understanding 



was reached with Russia that the independence 

 and integrity of Afghanistan should be re- 

 spected by both powers, the Ameer had been 

 anxious for an English alliance to protect him 

 from Russia ; then, while he was still seeking 

 to obtain a promise of protection, the Viceroy, 

 Lord Northbrook, by instruction of the Gov- 

 ernment, informed him, "in conciliatory lan- 

 guage," that "the discussion of the question 

 would be best postponed to a more convenient 

 season," and the feelings of his Highness be- 

 came unfavorable to the British Government. 

 He shortly afterward began to cultivate the 

 Russians, and met British overtures with in- 

 creasing coldness. Although the previous 

 efforts to secure the admission of a British 

 agency into the country had failed, the recep- 

 tion of a Russian mission in 1878 " left him " 

 (the Ameer) '' no further excuse for declining 

 to receive at his capital the envoy from the 



CANDAHAR. 



British Government " ; and the embassy of Sir 

 Neville Chamberlain was appointed, and con- 

 stituted of men chosen because they were per- 

 sonally acceptable to his Highness. The Ameer 

 was aware that the whole policy of the British 

 Government since his accession to the throne 

 had been to strengthen his power and authori- 

 ty and to protect him from foreign aggression, 

 although the methods adopted for doing so 

 might not at all times have accorded with his 

 own view; and he was bound by every bond 

 of international courtesy, as well as by the 

 treaty engagements of 1855, to a line of con- 

 duct the reverse of that which he had adopted. 

 The British forces were organized for the 

 contemplated advance in three divisions : the 

 Kuram Valley column, Major-General F. S. 

 Roberts commanding ; the Jumrood column, 



Major-General Sir Samuel Browne command- 

 ing; and the Quetta column, Major-General 

 A. S. Biddulph commanding, of which Lieu- 

 tenant-General Donald Stewart afterward took 

 the command. The whole force was reckoned 

 at 34,000 men, one third Europeans. 



On the 21st of November, the Ameer having 

 failed to return the answer and give the assu- 

 rances demanded by the British Government, 

 a detachment of British troops crossed the 

 frontier and occupied Fort Kapion, opposite 

 Thull, which had been abandoned by the Af- 

 ghan troops. On the next day, all the forces, 

 numbering about 35,000 troops, more than half 

 of whom were native, were ordered to move 

 forward. At daybreak on the 21st an advance 

 was made from Jumrood toward Fort Ali Mus- 

 jid, and an engagement took place which lasted 



