26 



ARKANSAS. 



judgment. The grounds of the decision of the 

 Federal Court are set forth by Judge Dillon of 

 the U. S. Circuit Court, Hewitt & Cooper vs. 

 Judge and Justices of Jefferson County. In 

 re Silverman, Judge of said County, Hewitt 

 recovered judgment in the Federal Court 

 against Jefferson County. The county did not 

 appeal from that judgment. Hewitt assigned 

 part of the judgment to Cooper. The Court 

 awarded a peremptory writ of mandamus to 

 compel the county authorities to levy a tax to 

 pay the judgment. The tax was levied and 

 afterward set aside. A rule was issued by the 

 Court against the County Judge of Jefferson 

 County, Frank Silverinan, to show cause why 

 he should not be punished for contempt in not 

 obeying the writ of mandamus directed to him 

 by the Court. He set up in defense that he 

 obeyed certain orders of the State Court. Judge 

 Dillon said : 



The county officers on the alternative writ which 

 issued had full opportunity to be heard against the 

 demands that were made against them. No sufficient 

 reason was shown by the county or its officers why 

 the peremptory writ of mandamus should not issue, 

 and the Court adjudged that it ought to be awarded. 

 The peremptory writ was directed to Frank Silver- 

 man, County Judge, and Craig and others, Justices 

 of the Peace, composing the County Court of Jef- 

 ferson County. It commanded them " to meet and 

 convene together at the courthouse in the town of 

 Pine Bluff, in said county, upon the day fixed by law 

 for levying taxes for county purposes for the year 

 1877, then and there to organize, open, and hold a 

 County Court of said connty, and to levy the tax of 

 five mills upon the dollar of all the taxable property 

 of said county, provided for by the Constitution of 

 the State of Arkansas, for the payment of indebted- 

 ness contracted and created before and existing at 

 the time of the ratification of this Constitution, pay- 

 able only in United States currency, and cause the 

 same to be collected at the same time and in the 

 same manner that other county taxes are directed by 

 law to be collected, and to cause the proceeds of the 

 said tax, as soon as collected, to be paid into the 

 registry of our said Circuit Court for the payment 

 and satisfaction of the said judgment, interest, and 

 costs." 



It appears that this writ was duly served, and that 

 in purs'uance of this command they did meet, and 

 levied the tax which the writ commanded them to 

 cause to be levied. Afterward, at the instance of cer- 

 tain tax-pavers of that county, a proceeding upon cer- 

 tiorari was instituted to have the order of the County 

 Court made in obedience to this writ reviewed by 

 the Circuit Court of the county ; and that proceed- 

 ing was begun and carried on in the local court with- 

 out any notice being given to the relators or parties 

 interested in the judgment; and in that proceeding 

 the State Circuit Court undertook to annul the order 

 of the County Court, made in obedience to the com- 

 mands of this Court, and certified its action to the 

 County Court in that regard. When that action was 

 certified to the County Court commanding that Court 

 to enter an order annulling its prior levy of taxes, the 

 County Court obeyed and caused that order to be 

 made. The tax had been extended on the tax-books 

 of the county, and the warrant for collection was in 

 the hands of the sheriff, who by the statutes of this 

 State is ex officio collector. "When it was known in 

 the community that the Circuit Court of the county 

 had made such order, the collector made return (in 

 obedience to a rule issued upon him) that, although 

 he demanded the tax, he was unable to collect it ; 

 that the tax-payers refused to pay it, and so practi- 



cably the commands contained in the writ we issued 

 have been of no avail. 



In the State of Iowa, some years since, we had 

 an important conflict between the State and Federal 

 judicial tribunals concerning the validity of bonds 

 issued by municipalities to aid in the construction 

 of railroads. The Supreme Court of that State held 

 that those bonds were unconstitutional, having, how- 

 ever, previously decided otherwise; and under the 

 first decision a large number of such bonds had been 

 issued. The State Supreme Court afterward changed 

 their judgment, and held the bonds to be invalid, 

 and proceedings were begun by tax-payers in the 

 courts of that State to enjoin the counties from levy- 

 ing any tax to pay judgments rendered in the Federal 

 Courts' on municipal bonds. The leading case in the 

 Supreme Court of the United States upon this sub- 

 ject, which is well known to the profession, is the 

 case of Kiggs vs. Johnson County, 6 Wallace Re- 

 ports. The case is a stronger one than the cause 

 now at the bar, because in that case the injunction 

 from the State Court against the officers of Johnson 

 County was issued before the writ of mandamus was 

 issued by the Federal Court. Here is a very correct 

 synopsis of the point ruled in that case : 



" After a return unsatisfied of an execution on a 

 judgment in a Circuit Court of the United States 

 against a county for interest on railroad bonds, is- 

 sued under a State statute in force prior to the issue 

 of the bonds, and which made the levy of a tax to 

 pay such interest obligatory on the county, a man- 

 damus from the Circuit Court of the United States 

 will lie against the county officers to levy a tax, even 

 although prior to the application for the mandamus 

 a State Court has perpetually enjoined the same offi- 

 cers against making such levy ; the mandamus, 

 when so issued^ being to be regarded as a writ neces- 

 sary to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court which 

 had previously attached, and to enforce its judg- 

 ments, and the State Court, therefore, not being re- 

 garded as in prior possession of the case." 



Now the State officers in the State of Iowa were 

 between two fires. First, the State Court enjoined 

 them from levying the tax, and a subsequent man- 

 damus from the Federal Court commanded them to 

 levy precisely the same tax which the writ of the 

 State Court forbade. If they obeyed the mandamus 

 of the Federal Court, and levied the tax, the State 

 Court would, they said, arrest them for contempt of 

 its writ and punish them. If they disregarded the 

 1 command of the writ of mandamus the Federal 

 Court would attach them for contempt and punish 

 them. Now, what was to be done ? It was this di- 

 lemma the County Judge, in the case at bar, said he 

 supposed he was in: "I am subject to two com- 

 mands ; the Federal Court commands the levying of 

 this tax, and the Circuit Court for the county has 

 commanded me to annul the levy." He obeyed the 

 orders of the local court, and in so doing he simply 

 obeyed the wrong tribunal. 



T'he subject is very fully considered by the Su- 

 preme Court of the United States in the above-men- 

 tioned case of Eiggs vs. Johnson County. It would 

 consume too much time to repeat it at length; but 

 the effect of it is, that in judgments rendered in this 

 class of cases the writ of mandamus is a writ neces- 

 sary to enforce the judgment, and that judgment 

 can no more be interfered with by the State Courts 

 than they can undertake to interfere with an ordi- 

 nary writ of execution in the hands of the Marshal 

 of this Court ; nor can the State Court any more in- 

 terfere than the Federal Court could interfere with 

 their judgments or process. It is a rule that one 

 Court shall not interfere with the processes of the 

 other ;_ and when this rule is observed harmony 

 exists in both, and there can be no conflict. 



In the case first cited the Supreme Court of trie 

 United States uses this language : " State Courts are 

 exempt from all interference by the Federal tribu- 

 nals, put they are destitute of all power to restrain 



