AFGHANISTAN. 



11 



ish till they set fire to the buildings, when the 

 defenders camo out, sword in hand, and were 

 all slain. More than two hundred of the muti- 

 neers were killed by the British during the con- 

 flict. In a letter which be sent with news of 

 the disaster to the British at AH Khel, the 

 Ameer professed to have been completely sur- 

 prised at the outbreak, and powerless to con- 

 trol it. Several messengers were dispatched 

 to him from the residency during the attack 

 with requests for help, but they all seem to 

 have been intercepted hi going or coming. On 

 one of the letters which reached him he wrote, 

 "If God will, I am lust making arrangements," 

 but the answer did not reach the residency. 

 The Ameer sent one of his officers, Daoud 

 Shah, to persuade the mutineers and the mob 

 to desist from the attack ; but he was set upon 

 by them and dangerously wounded. He then 

 sent his son, with a similar result. He repre- 

 sented that he was himself besieged, with only 

 five attendants, at the time his letter was sent 

 to AH Khel, and implored the aid of the Brit- 

 ish. Thirty-one persons of the residency es- 

 caped the massacre, including twenty-two who 

 were out cutting grass, and others who were 

 absent. It has not clearly appeared whether 

 the revolt was a spontaneous outbreak or a 

 premeditated effort to get rid of the British. 

 The enemies of Russia declared that it was the 

 result of Russian intrigue. Some pointed to 

 Ayoob Khan, the Ameer's brother, as its prob- 

 able instigator. The Ameer was suspected of 

 treachery by many, and believed to be in com- 

 plicity with it while he pretended to deprecate 

 it ; but the Indian authorities appeared, so far 

 as open acts went, still to have confidence in 

 his good faith; and some averred that the 

 event proved the soundness of the position 

 which Shere AH had maintained, that the tem- 

 per of the Afghan people was such that he 

 could not safely allow a British embassy to 

 reside with him. The residence of the em- 

 bassy had not been without warnings of dan- 

 ger several days previous to the outbreak. A 

 street riot took place on the 13th of August 

 between some Afghan soldiers and some mem- 

 bers of the envoy's escort, in which the pop- 

 ulace took the side of the soldiery, and the 

 residence men were beaten; and on the 16th 

 of August the Ameer advised Major Oavagnari 

 to discontinue the custom of riding about Ca- 

 bool and its vicinity, as an attempt might be 

 made upon his life. Major Cavagnari is report- 

 ed to have replied that, if he were killed, there 

 were many more men in India who would bo 

 ready to act as his successor. 



An outbreak took place at Herat two days 

 after the mutiny at Oabool, when three regi- 

 ments, which had been ordered to march away 

 to quell disturbances in Turkistan, rose against 

 the Fakir Ahmed Khan, the civil and military 

 governor, killed him, and plundered his house. 

 Another revolt was reported in the district of 

 Kohistan. 



On the llth of September the Ameer wrote 



to the Viceroy of India: "I am dreadfully 

 distressed and aggrieved at recent events, but 

 there is no fighting against God's will. I hope 

 to inflict such punishment on the evil-doers as 

 will be known world-wide and prove my sin- 

 cerity. I have twice written on this subject, 

 and the third time by my confidential servant, 

 Shere Mahomed Khan. I had written to say 

 that for these eight days I have preserved 

 myself and family by the good offices of those 

 who were friendly to me, partly by bribes, 

 partly by hoaxing the rebels. Some of the 

 cavalry I have dismissed, and night and day I 

 am considering how to put matters straight. 

 Please God, the mutineers will soon meet with 

 the punishment they deserve, and my affairs 

 will be arranged to the satisfaction of the 

 British Government. Certain persons of high 

 position in these provinces have become rebel- 

 lious, but I am watching carefully and closely 

 every quarter. I have done all I could to insure 

 Nawab Gholarn Hussein's safety. I trust to 

 God for an opportunity of showing my sincere 

 friendship for the British Government and 

 of securing my good name before the world." 

 The Ameer was informed that a strong British 

 force would march speedily on Cabool to his 

 relief, and that he should use all his resources 

 to cooperate and facilitate its march through 

 his country. 



Preparations were begun immediately on 

 receiving the news of the massacre of the em- 

 bassy to dispatch an adequate military force to 

 Cabool to restore order and chastise the rebels. 

 The force was organized in three columns, the 

 first of which, under General Roberts, should 

 consist of three batteries of artillery, one squad- 

 ron of British cavalry, two and a half regiments 

 of native cavalry, three regiments of British 

 infantry, four regiments of native infantry, and 

 one company of sappers, in all about 6,500 

 men, and should take the country from Shu- 

 targardan to Cabool. A second force, of about 

 4,000 men, under the command of General J. 

 Gordon, should hold the country from Shutar- 

 gardan to Thull. The Khyber force consist- 

 ing of five batteries of artillery, a body of 

 British cavalry, four regiments of native cav- 

 alry, two regiments of British infantry, five 

 regiments of native infantry, and two columns 

 of sappers, in all, about 6,600 men, in addition 

 to the Peshawer garrison and the troops already 

 holding the Khyber Pass, up to Lundi Khotal, 

 the whole placed under the command of Major- 

 General Bright would protect the road from 

 Peshawer to Gundamuk, garrison the interme- 

 diate stations, and provide a movable column 

 to hold Jagdalak and communicate with Ca- 

 bool. The reserve at Peshawer and Rawul 

 Pindee numbered about 6,000 men. The in- 

 tention was afterward announced of increasing 

 the Khyber and Kuram forces to the strength 

 of 12,000 men each. The orders which had 

 been issued for the evacuation of positions in 

 Afghanistan were revoked so far as regarded 

 points at which military forces still remained. 



