592 



MARYLAND. 



ous traditions which dedicate this country exclusively 

 to the natural rights of man ; 



And whereas, The welfare and peace of the repub- 

 lic, the equal religious rights of its citizens, and the 

 most precious interests of civilization t alike require 

 that all the political and educational institutions of 

 the nation which are supported by taxation should be 

 more faithfully conformed to the spirit of its funda- 

 mental law therefore, 



Be it resolved, That, as a means to the accomplish- 

 ment of this object, we urge the adoption of such a 

 " religious freedom amendment" of the United States 

 Constitution as shall effect the complete secularization 

 of the Government in all its departments and institu- 

 tions, State and national, and shall secure to every 

 American citizen the full enjoyment of his opinions on 

 the subject of religion, without molestation, disability, 

 or deprivation of any civil or political right. 



Resolved, That we advocate the equitable taxation 

 of church property ; the total discontinuance of reli- 

 gious instruction and worship in the public schools ; 

 the repeal of all laws enforcing the observance of Sun- 

 day as the Sabbath ; the cessation of all appropriations 

 of public funds for religious institutions or purposes 

 of any kind ; the abolition of state-paid chaplaincies : 

 the non-appointment of religious fasts, festivals, ana 

 holidays by public authority ; and whatever other 

 measures or principles may be necessary to the total 

 separation of church and state. 



Resolved, That we promote by all peaceable and 

 orderly means active agitation and propagandism of 

 the great principles of religious liberty and equal 

 rights, and in all other proper and practical ways pro- 

 mote the final emancipation of the state from the con- 

 trol of the church, and to foster the development of 

 that natural intelligence and morality which constitute 

 the necessary and all-sufficient basis of secular gov- 

 ernment. 



One of the Baltimore City Judges, in his 

 charge to the grand jury, argued in favor of 

 the law as a police measure. He is thus re- 

 ported : 



_ While disavowing all puritanical notions or preju- 

 dices in regard to the manner in which the Christian 

 day of rest should be observed, the Judge bore testimo- 

 ny as a magistrate to the value and necessity of a Sun- 

 day law restricting and regulating the sale of liquor as a 

 measure of police, and as a security for the preservation 

 of public order and tranquillity on a day of idleness and 

 compulsory abstentio_n from work. Judge Pinkney 

 cited the docket of his Court as a witness in this re- 

 spect to the beneficial results of the Sunday law. That 

 the law itself was adopted and is maintained absolutely 

 as a measure of police, and not upon merely temper- 

 ance or moral grounds, the Judge is historically cor- 

 rect in saying. 



The occasion of these remarks was supposed 

 to have been furnished by the multiplication 

 of incorporated societies or clubs for avowedly 

 literary, benevolent, or " social " purposes, but 

 with the real purpose, as supposed, of evading 

 the stringent provisions of the Sunday law. 

 In the case of two or three of the well-known 

 social clubs of Baltimore, one of the Judges 

 (Gilmor), when presiding in the Criminal Court, 

 had decided that the law prohibiting the sell- 

 ing or giving away, or otherwise disposing of 

 certain commodities on Sunday, wines and li- 

 quors included, had no application. The clubs 

 in question kept no bar in the ordinary sense 

 of the word, did not keep or sell wines, liquors, 

 etc., for profit, and the use of such articles by 

 members or privileged guests was no more in- 

 hibited by the law than the use of the same 



articles by the guests or boarders of a hotel or 

 members of a private family. The incorporated 

 institutions in question were shown by the 

 evidence at the trial to be in the nature of co- 

 operative housekeeping establishments, and the 

 use and consumption of liquors, etc., merely 

 incidental to the main object of their forma- 

 tion, and in no sense, therefore, to be regarded 

 as an evasion, practical or designed, of the Sun- 

 day law. 



The question of the power of justices of the 

 peace to commit to jail in default of payment 

 of fine and costs, and in default of security to 

 keep the peace, was thus decided in the Court 

 of Common Pleas : 



Since the establishment of the Board of Police the 

 preservation of the public peace and order has been 

 committed to that body, and arrests for the violation 

 of peace and order are now made by the police force 

 under its control, and not by constables. There is no 

 law making it an offense to be drunk in the presence 

 of an officer of the police force, and therefore it is not 

 an offense for the prisoner in this case to be drunk in 

 the presence of the officer who arrested her and who 

 made the charge. It has been suggested that if a man is 

 found drunk on the street and is arrested and brought 

 before a justice, this is drunkenness " hi the presence 

 of a justice," which authorizes him to impose a fine. 

 Such a construction of the law would, I think, be 

 unwarrantable, because the accused would be taken 

 against his will into the presence of the justice, and 

 the law could not have been intended to punish him 

 for a compulsory appearance. The justice, therefore, 

 had no right on either ground to impose a fine upon 

 the petitioner, and her imprisonment for the non-pay- 

 ment of the fine and costs is illegal. 



The views of the Court on the question 

 whether drunkenness on the public streets is 

 an offense at common law were thus stated : 



I now proceed to consider the question whether 

 drunkenness on the public streets is an offense at com- 

 mon law. It is conceded that private drunkenness is 

 an offense against morality, of which the common law 

 takes no cognizance. Open drunkenness on the pub- 

 lic streets of towns and cities has unhappily been al- 

 ways a thing of frequent occurrence hi England and 

 in this country, and. if it be a criminal offense, it is 

 hardly possible to believe that it would not have been 

 so decided in numerous cases. Few authorities are 

 cited hi support of the doctrine. The strongest case 

 is that of Smith vs. the State, decided in Tennessee. 1 

 Humph., 396 j and yet the Court in that case, while 

 it admitted that open drunkenness was a criminal of- 

 fense, held that the charge that an individual was ' ' un- 

 lawfully, openly, publicly, and notoriously drunk," 

 was an insufficient description of the offensej so as to 

 put the party on his defense and satisfy him of the facts 

 to be proved ; and the Court advised that the charge 

 should always be that the accused was " openly and 

 notoriously drunk upon the day stated, and upon 

 divers other days before that time." In the case in 

 North Carolina of the State vs. Waller, 3 Murphy, 229, 

 also relied on by the State, the Court held that private 

 drunkenness is no offense ; that it becomes so oy be- 

 ing open and exposed to public view so as to become a 

 nuisance ; that it must be so charged, and that the jury 

 must so find it before the Court can render judgment. 

 The charge hi that case was that the defendant was " a 

 common, gross, and notorious drunkard, and that he 

 on divers days and times got grossly drunk." No 

 case has been cited, and I suppose none can be found, 

 where a party has been found guilty at common law 

 on a charge of drunkenness upon a single occasion, 

 and I am satisfied that such a conviction could not be 

 sustained in Maryland. The doctrine of the common 



