GUITEAU'S TEIAL. 



381 



GUITEAU'S TRIAL. Within a few days 

 after the death of President Garfield proceed- 

 ings were begun in the District of Columbia 

 for bringing his assailant to trial on a charge 

 of murder. At first a question of jurisdiction 

 was raised, the death of the victim having 

 occurred in the State of New Jersey. The 

 opinion was expressed that the rule of the 

 common law prevailed in the District, and that 

 its courts could not have jurisdiction in a case 

 of murder unless the death as well as the crimi- 

 nal act occurred within its boundaries. There 

 was no doubt that the courts of New Jersey 

 would have jurisdiction, inasmuch as the stat- 

 ute law of that State provided that both in the 

 case of death within its limits from criminal 

 injury caused elsewhere, and injury within its 

 limits resulting in death elsewhere, indictment 

 could be found and tried in the county within 

 which either the death or the injury took place. 

 At the request of Judge E. W. Scudder, of the 

 Supreme Court of New Jersey, Attorney-Gen- 

 eral Stockton considered the question of the 

 proper action to be taken in that State. He 

 wrote to District - Attorney Corkhill, of the 

 District of Columbia, stating that he should 

 not advise any legal proceedings to be taken in 

 New Jersey with a view to the punishment of 

 the crime of Guiteau, unless he should be in- 

 formed that it could not be punished under the 

 jurisdiction of the courts of the Federal Dis- 

 trict. The District Attorney replied that he 

 had no doubt that the law in force there would 

 be found adequate to meet the case. Judge 

 Scudder accordingly, on the 4th of October, 

 charged the Grand Jury of Monmouth County 

 that it would not be advisable or necessary " to 

 take any action in this matter at the present 

 time, unless we shall be notified that the prose- 

 cution and indictment of the offense in this 

 county are required to prevent a failure of jus- 

 tice, which does not now appear probable, ac- 

 cording to the statement made by the proper 

 legal authority of the city of Washington." 



The case had by this time been already 

 brought before the Grand Jury of the District 

 of Columbia on the evidence of Surgeon-Gen- 

 eral Barnes, who testified in relation to the 

 wound ; George W. Adams and Officer Kear- 

 ney, who witnessed the shooting ; and Dr. D. 

 S. Lamb, who conducted the autopsy of the 

 President's body. The presentment of the 

 jury was made on the 4th of October, the in- 

 dictment was found in due form a few days 

 later, and on the 14th of October the prisoner 

 was arraigned in court to plead to the indict- 

 ment. In the mean time he had caused to be 

 printed in one of the public journals a state- 

 ment of facts and an explanation of his motives. 

 In this he gave a long account of his career, 

 his participation in the political canvass of 

 1880, and his efforts to obtain an appoint- 

 ment at the hands of the new Administration. 

 He said : 



My conception of the idea of removing the President 

 was this : Mr. Conkling resigned on Monday, May 16, 



1881. On the following Wednesday I was in bed. I 

 think I retired about eight o'clock. I felt depressed 

 and perplexed on account of the political situation, and 

 I retired much earlier than usual. 1 felt wearied in 

 mind and body, and I was in my bed about nine 

 o'clock, and I was thinking over the political situa- 

 tion, and the idea flashed through my brain that if 

 the President was out of the way everything would go 

 better. 



He then proceeded to give a detailed account 

 of his preparation for the crime and of its exe- 

 cution, claiming that he was under a divine 

 pressure which he could not resist. In regard 

 to the legal aspect of the case and his defense, 

 he said : 



I shot the President without malice or murderous 

 intent. I deny any legal liability in this case. In 

 order to constitute the crime of murder two elements 

 must co-exist. First, an actual homicide ; second, mal- 

 ice malice in law or malice in fact. The law presumes 

 malice from the fact of the homicide : the degree of 

 malice depends upon the condition of the man's mind 

 at the time of the homicide. If two men quarrel and 

 one shoots the other in heat or passion, the law says 

 that is manslaughter. The remoteness of the shooting 

 from the moment of its conception fastens the degree 

 of the malice. The further you go from the concep- 

 tion to the shooting the greater the malice, because 

 the law says that in shooting a man a few hours or a 

 few days after the conception the mind has a chance 

 to cool, and therefore the act is deliberate. Malice 

 in fact depends upon the circumstances attending the 

 homicide. Malice in law is liquidated in this case by 

 the facts and circumstances, as set forth in these pages, 

 attending the removal of the President. I had none 

 but the best of feelings, personally, toward the Presi- 

 dent. I always thought of him and spoke of him as 

 General Garfield. 



At the request of the accused, his brother- 

 in-law, George M. Scoville, of Chicago, took 

 charge of his defense. Attempts to secure the 

 aid of prominent lawyers, including R. T. Mer- 

 rick, of Washington ; Emory A. Storrs, of Chi- 

 cago; and B. F. Butler, of Massachusetts, were 

 unsuccessful, though Mr. Merrick expressed his 

 willingness to argue the question of jurisdiction, 

 if it were made an issue in the case. On his 

 arraignment the prisoner pleaded " Not guilty," 

 and desired to make a statement, but the priv- 

 ilege was denied, as not appropriate at that 

 time. In arguing for a delay of the trial, Mr. 

 Scoville stated that the defense would consist 

 of two points : First, the insanity of the de- 

 fendant; and, second, that the wound was not 

 necessarily mortal, and was not the cause of 

 death: The time of trial was fixed for Novem- 

 ber 7th, and it was intimated that there might 

 be a preliminary consideration of the question 

 of jurisdiction. This was not had, however, 

 as the plea of " Not guilty " waived for the 

 time the objection on this point. Subsequent- 

 ly Judge Cox, of the Criminal Court, assigned 

 Mr. Leigh Robinson to be associate counsel for 

 the defense ; and Mr. Walter D. Davidge, of 

 Washington, and John K. Porter, of New York, 

 were employed to assist in the prosecution. A 

 motion for the postponement of the trial to 

 November 21st resulted in its being set down 

 peremptorily for the 14th of that month. In 

 the mean time an order was obtained from the 



