GUITEAU'S TRIAL. 



389 



in chief for the prosecution. He therefore thought 

 that the testimony of Dr. McFarland could not be re- 

 ceived on the question of the prisoner's sanity. 



The offer was also made to prove that immediately 

 after the assassination the prisoner claimed to have 

 acted under inspiration. When the prisoner was on 

 the stand as a witness he testified that he had com- 

 mitted this act under what he called, indifferently, 

 inspiration or pressure. To rebut that testimony the 

 prosecution had put on the stand Mr. Reynolds, who 

 testified th.it he had an interview with the prisoner 

 two weeks after the assassinatioUj and that in that in- 

 terview the prisoner did not claim to have acted un- 

 der inspiration, but assigned, exclusively, political mo- 

 tives. It was not the object of the Government to 

 prove that he did not claim inspiration, but simply to 

 ask the jury to infer that the prisoner never did claim 

 this inspiration until several weeks after the assassi- 

 nation, and after he had discovered that these men, 

 whom lie supposed he was benefiting by his deed, had 

 repudiated it and were denouncing him. The hypo- 

 thetical case, put by the prosecution to the experts, 

 assumed that no claim of having acted under inspira- 

 tion was made by the prisoner until two weeks after- 

 ward and up to the time of this interview of Mr. Eey- 

 n >ld-s with him. It would be an answer to that to 

 r-ii >.v that on the very day of the assassination the 

 prisoner did claim inspiration. As surrebutting tes- 

 timony that evidence ou^ht to be received. It struck 

 him as strictly surrebutting testimony. As to the 

 other testimony offered, which was not in reply to 

 anything on the part of the Government, the common- 

 law practice was that the Government should summon 

 all the witnesses whose names were indorsed on the 

 indictment, and it was really incumbent on the Gov- 

 ernment, as a matter of fairness, to summon all the 

 witnesses who had been present at the transaction and 

 had seen it. The Government was not bound, how- 

 ever, to examine all the witnesses so summoned ; but 

 as soon as the case for the Government was closed 

 those witnesses were at the disposal of the defense. 

 The proper time for the defense to call upon them was 

 when the rebutting testimony was in course of pres- 

 entation. In this case the defense had occupied^ two 

 weeks in the presentation of its rebutting testimony, 

 and it was at that time that, strictly speaking, this 

 evidence should have been offered, if offered at all. 



The next question was. what consideration should 

 influence the court in allowing additional evidence 

 which might have been produced if known at the 

 proper time. Such evidence ought not to be admitted 

 if it was purely cumulative. For example, the men- 

 tal condition of Luther W. Guiteau had oeen so thor- 

 oughly canvassed on both sides that anything more 

 in addition to that seemed purely and exclusively cu- 

 mulative. Besides, it was not a direct fact in issue, 

 but a somewhat collateral issue. The proof of Luther 

 W. Guiteau's insanity did not prove that of the pris- 

 oner. It did nothing more than merely tend to cor- 

 roborate the direct testimony on that point. He did 

 not think that it ought to be admitted. As to the 

 proposition to offer witnesses who had seen the pris- 

 oner in a public park a few days before the assassina- 

 tion, and nad gathered from nis conduct the impres- 

 sion that he was out of his mind, such testimony was 

 of a very vague and uncertain character, and he did 

 not think it sufficiently definite to warrant him in 

 opening the case again. The only thing that he felt 

 any uncertainty about was in reference to the testi- 

 mony of detective McElfresh, who conducted the pris- 

 oner to the jail immediately after the occurrence. He 

 would like more definite information as to what McEl- 

 fresh could prove. 



The prisoner : I had a talk with McElfresh going 

 in a carriage to the jail. He wanted to know why I 

 did it. I said it was on account of the political situa- 

 tion. I said, "Are you a stalwart?" and he said 

 " Yes." He said, " There are a great many people 

 who feel just like you in regard to the Republican 

 party." The point was, it was the political situation 



which drove me on the President. The prosecution 

 wanted to show that it was because I was a disap- 

 pointed office-seeker. I was not a disappointed of- 

 lice-seeker, and I would not have taken the .Paris con- 

 sulship after the 1st of June. Under the circum- 

 stances, therefore, I have a right to show that, on the 

 day of the shooting, I told McElfresh that the cause 

 was the political situation, and that without the polit- 

 ical situation the President would not have been re- 

 moved and he would not have been removed any 

 way, if the Lord had not crowded me into it. 



Judge Cox (getting a chance to finish his ruling) 

 said that if he had an affidavit as to what McElfresh 

 would testify to he might be able to decide more sat- 

 isfactorily, but that at present it seemed to him too 

 vague, lie thought, however, that the testimony as 

 to the claim of inspiration, made on the day ot the 

 assassination or on the day after, was admissible as 

 rebutting testimony. 



The evidence was completed on the 4th of 

 January, and the prosecution, through Mr. Da- 

 vidge, presented the following requests to the 

 court for rulings on the law points involved : 



1. The legal test of responsibility where insanity is 

 set up as a defense for the alleged crime is whether 

 the accused, at the time of committing the act alleged, 

 knew the difference between right and wrong in re- 

 spect of such act. Hence, in the present case, if the 

 accused, at the time of committing the act charged, 

 knew the difference between right and wrong in re- 

 spect of such act that is, if he knew whatne was 

 doing, and that what he was doing was contrary to the 

 law of the land he is responsible. 



2. If the accused knew what he was doing, and that 

 what he was doing was contrary to the law of the land, 

 it constitutes no defense, even if it were true, that when 

 he committed the act he really believed that he was 

 thereby producing a public benefit, or carrying out an 

 inspiration of divine origin or approval. Such belief 

 would not afford any excuse, nor would such excuse be 

 afforded by the fact that, in the commission of the act, 

 ho was impelled by a depraved moral sense, whether 

 innate or acquired, or by evil passion or indifference 

 to moral obligation. 



8. Insanity would, however, constitute a defense if, 

 by reason or disease, the accused, at the time of com- 

 mitting the act charged, did not know what he was 

 doing, or, if he did know it, that what he was doing 

 was contrary to law. 



4. The only evidence in the present case tending to 

 show an irresistible impulse to commit the homicide 

 is the claim of the accused that his free agency was de- 

 stroyed by his alleged conviction that the death of the 

 President was required for the good of the American 

 people, and was divinely inspired ; but such convic- 

 tion, even if it really existed, could not afford any ex- 

 cuse, when the party knew what he was doing, and 

 that it was contrary to law. No mere delusion or error 

 of judgment, not even a fixed belief that what is pro- 

 hibited by tne law is commanded or approved by 

 divine authority, can exempt the accused from re- 

 sponsibility for breaking the law. To have such effect, 

 the commission of the act charged must have been the 

 result of an insane delusion, which was the product of 

 disease, and of such force as to deprive the accused of 

 the degree of reason necessary to distinguish between 

 right and wrong in respect of the act, so that at the 

 time of committing the act he either did not know 

 what he was doing, or if he di-1, that the act was wrong 

 or contrary to the law of the land. 



The court adjourned until the 7th, to allow 

 the defense time to prepare their requests, 

 which were as follows : 



1. The legal test of responsibility, when insanity is 

 set up as a defense for alleged crime, is not merely 

 whether the accused knew at the time what he was 

 doing, and that the act was contrary to law, for an ir- 



