390 



GUITEAU'S TRIAL. 



responsible insane person may know those things, but 

 was the act done as the result of un insane delusion, 

 or was it committed under an influence or power which 

 the accused could not resist by reason of his unsound- 

 ness of mind ' 



2. Although the accused may have known what he 

 was doing, and that what he was doing was contrary 

 to the law of the land, yet if, when he performed the 

 act, he really believed that he was thereby producing a 

 public benefit, and was actuated by an insane delusion 

 that he was carrying out uu inspiration of divine origin 

 or approval, and would not have done the act but for 

 such insane delusion, then the accused is not guilty of 

 the crime charged against him, and the jury should 

 find him " not guilty, by reason of insanity." 



8. Insanity constitutes a defense if, by reason of it, 

 the accused, at the time of committing the act charged, 

 did not know what he was doing ; or, if he did not 

 know that what he was doing was contrary to law ; or, 

 if the act would not have been done by him but for 

 reason of the insanity. 



4. The only evidence in the present case tending to 

 show an irresistible impulse to commit the homicide, 

 or that the accused acted under the pressure of an in- 

 sane delusion in doing the act, is found in the conduct 

 and words of the accused as detailed in evidence. The 

 Question whether the free agency of the accused was 

 destroyed by a conviction on his part that the death 

 of the President was required for the good of the 

 American people, and that he was divinely inspired to 

 remove him by death, is one of fact to bo determined 

 by the jury from all the evidence in the case, and such 

 evidence includes the acts as well as the words of the 

 accused. But such conviction, if it really existed, 

 could not afford any excuse when the party knew what 

 he was doing, and that it was contrary to law, unless 

 it was the product of an insane delusion, and he was 

 impelled to do the act by such delusion. Such delu- 

 sion may exist as to a divine requirement, or as to an 

 inspiration from God. No mere delusion, unless it be 



can exempt the accused from responsibility for break- 

 ing the law, if at the time he knew what he was doing 

 and that it was contrary to law, and he was not acting 

 under an insane delusion. To have such effect, the 

 committing of the act charged must have been the re- 

 sult of an insane delusion of such force as to deprive 

 the accused of the degree of reason necessary to dis- 

 tinguish between right and wrong in respect of the 

 act, as sane people generally judge of sucn conduct. 

 The delusion must have been "such that at the time of 

 committing the act he either did not know what he 

 was doing, or, if he did, he must have acted under a 

 controlling conviction that the act was right. Al- 

 though he may have known that the act was contrary 

 to the law of the land, yet if he did it under the insane 

 delusion that it was commanded to be done by God, 

 such knowledge on his part would not make him liable 

 to punishment. 



5. Whether insanity exists or has existed at any time 

 with the prisoner, and the degree of insanitv, if any 

 existed or has existed, are questions of fact to be deter- 

 mined entirely by the jury from the evidence. 



6. If the jury find from the evidence that the pris- 

 oner was of unsound mind at the time of the doing ot 

 the act charged against him as criminal in this case, 

 then it is also the duty of the jury to find whether 

 said act was the result of such unsoundness of mind 

 of the prisoner. 



7. The punishments of the law are intended for ra- 

 tional persons, and no one but a rational person can 

 commit the crime of murder. 



8. Insanity may be interposed as a legal defense in 

 any prosecution for an otherwise criminal act, and, it 

 such defense be established by the evidence, it takes 

 away the criminality, and the act ceases to be a crime 

 in contemplation of" law. 



9. If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to the san- 



ity of the accused at the time of committing the act 

 charged against him as a crime, they should give him 

 the benefit of that doubt, and should find him " not 

 guilty, by reason of insanity." 



10. The jury are the sole judges of the credibility of 

 witnesses, ana have a right to take into account, in 

 weighing the evidence, any apparent feeling or inter- 

 est manifested by witnesses on the stand, their manner 

 of testifying, their compensation or want of compensa- 

 tion, and any oilier circumstances connected with their 

 testimony which the jury may think would influence 

 them. 



11. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the 

 prosecution have willfully suppressed evidence of the 

 mental condition of the accused during two weeks next 

 following the shooting of President Garfield, which it 

 was in their power to have produced on the trial, the 

 jury have a right to take that fact into consideration, 

 as raising a presumption that such evidence, if pro- 

 duced, would have been unfavorable for the prosecu- 

 tion. 



12. If the jury shall believe, from the evidence, that 

 the prisoner was of sound mind, or not so insane as to 

 be irresponsible for the act, at the time of shooting at 

 the President, on the 2d day of July, 1881, and that he 

 then unlawfully and willfully, but without malice in 

 fact, in the District of Columbia, shot at and thereby 

 injured the President, of which shooting and injury 

 the person so injured subsequently died in the State of 

 New Jersey, and within the United States, then the 

 prisoner is guilty of the crime of manslaughter, and the 

 jury should so find. 



13. The jury are instructed to find a separate verdict 

 upon each count in the indictment, and, inasmuch as 

 it is charged in the first, second, fourth, fifth, seventh, 

 and eighth counts of the indictment in this case, that 

 the death of the President took place in the county of 

 "Washington, in the said District of Columbia, and 

 there is no evidence of such fact, therefore the j ury are 

 directed to find the accused not guilty upon each of 

 said counts, separately. 



14. Inasmuch, as the evidence is uncontradicted in 

 this case that the wound was inflicted upon the Presi- 

 dent by the accused, on the 2d day of July, A. n. 1881, 

 in the county of "Washington, in the District of Colum- 

 bia, and that the President subsequently, and in the 

 month of September, A. D. 1881, died of such wound 

 in the State of New Jersey, the jury are instructed 

 that, by reason of these facts, the accused is not guilty 

 of the crime of murder charged in the indictment, and 

 the verdict must be " notguiltv," unless the jury shall 

 find him guilty of manslaughter, as charged in the 

 twelfth prayer of the defense. 



Arguments to the court on these points were 

 made by Messrs. Davidge, Corkhill, and Porter 

 for the prosecution, and Reed and Scoville for 

 the defense, accompanied by some sharp criti- 

 cisms on each side with reference to the con- 

 duct of counsel on the other. The District 

 Attorney took occasion in his argument to 

 examine the question of jurisdiction. On the 

 10th of January, after the close of the argu- 

 ments, Judge Cox proceeded to state his views 

 on the prayers submitted on both sides first 

 giving his attention to the question of juris- 

 diction. He said that at an early stage in the 

 case he had expressed a preference to hear 

 that question discussed in a preliminary form 

 by way of demurrer, or motion, or plea, be- 

 cause a determination of it adversely to the 

 jurisdiction would have spared all the labor 

 and trouble of the trial. Counsel, however, 

 had the privilege of making the question at 

 any stage of the case. The jnrisdiction of the 

 court had been publicly discussed and seriously 



