392 



GUITEAU'S TRIAL. 



It is expressed in the first sentence of the first prayer, 

 in these words : " Or was it committed under an in- 

 fluence or power which the accused could not resist 

 by reason of his unsoundness of mind I " It can not 

 be denied that some of the_ most respectable courts in 

 this country have recognized it :is possible that a 

 man may be driven against his own will to the com- 

 mission of an act which he knows to be wrong by an 

 insane, irrepressible impulse within him, overriding 

 hia own will and conscience ; and those courts main- 

 tain that, as under such circumstances the will to do 

 wrong (which is the very essence of criminality) is 

 wanting, he ought not to be held criminally responsi- 

 ble. They, therefore, hold that the test of the knowl- 

 edge of right or wrong ought to be qualified by the 

 further condition whether the person nad the power 

 to choose between doing or not doing the act. The 

 question is a dangerous one alike for courts and juries 

 to handle, and 1 do not intend to express an opinion 

 upon it, further than the facts of the case require. 

 Those facts seem to relieve me from the necessity and 

 the responsibility of discussing it generally, if we 

 struck out of this case all the declarations and tes- 

 timony of the defendant himself, we have no light 

 whatever on this subject. There are circumstances, 

 such as his actions and conduct, which, his counsel 

 may argue, of themselves indicated some aberration, 

 and are corroborative of and explained by his testi- 

 mony. But of themselves they would hctvc afforded 

 no indication of the particular motive or special form 

 of delusion that actuated him. Of this we have no 

 indications except in the declarations, oral or written. 

 of the defendant himself. But he has never claimed 

 that he was irresistibly impelled to do an act which 

 he knew to be wrong. On the contrary, he always 

 claimed that it was right. He justified it at the time, 

 and afterward, in his papers, as a political necessity 

 and an act of patriotism, and M'hetner he claimed in- 

 spiration early or late, he has claimed that the act 

 was inspired, and therefore right. He has used the 

 words "pressure" and "inspiration" interchange- 

 ably, as it were, to express the idea. This has no 

 meaning unless it be that he was under an insane de- 

 lusion that the Deity had inspired and commanded 

 the act. He has certainly not separated the idea of 

 pressure and impulse from the conviction of inspira- 

 tion and right and duty. 



The defendant has asserted no form of insanity 

 which does not involve the conviction that the act was 

 right, and I feel sure that I am not transcending the 

 privilege of the court when 1 say that there is no evi- 

 dence in the case outside of his own declaration tend- 

 ing to prove irresistible impulse as a thing by itself 

 and separate from this alleged delusion. Therefore, 

 the case does not seem to me to present or call for any 

 ruling on the hypothesis of an irresistible impulse to 

 do what the accused knew to be wrong and wnat was 

 against his will. Whether there is such a thingr 

 as irresistible insane impulse to commit crime, and 

 whether it has existed in any particular case, are ques- 

 tions of fact and not of law. In this case, I think, 

 there is no testimony showing that it can exist by it- 

 self as an independent form of insanity, but rather 

 the contrary. There is, however, testimony tending 

 to show that such impulses result from and are asso- 

 ciated with insane delusions, and especially with an 

 insane delusion as that the party has received a com- 

 mand from the Deity to do an act. But if such an 

 insane delusion exists, so as to destroy the perceptions 

 of right and wrong as to the act (which is substantially 

 the defendant's claim), this of itself is irresponsible 

 insanity, and there is no need to consider the subject 

 of impulses resulting from the delusion. On the other 

 hand, if there were no insanity, but a mere fanatical 

 opinion or belief, the only impulse that could have 

 actuated the defendant must have been a sane one 

 such a one as, in the most favorable view of it, a mis- 

 taken sense of duty which impulse the law requires 

 him to resist and control. 



In connection with the medical testimony tending 



to show that these impulses are always or generally 

 associated with some insane delusion, if there are facts 

 tending directly to show the existence or absence of 

 an irresistible impulse, they may perhaps furnish some 

 evidence of the existence or absence of insane delu- 

 sion. But I think, in view of the undisputed features 

 of this case, it would only confuse and perhaps mis- 

 lead the jury to give them any instruction direct Iv 

 upon the subject of irresistible impulse, and that this 

 particular case does not call for any qualification for 

 the general rule adopted, as I have mentioned, as the 

 test of responsibility. 



The twelfth instruction is drawn with reference to 

 section 5342 of the Eevised Statutes. I do not un- 

 derstand that statute to create any new species of 

 manslaughter. It uses the common-law definitions of 

 both murder and manslaughter, and (perhaps in view 

 of the doubts I have already spoken of) applies them 

 to two cases where the mortal wound was inflicted in 

 one jurisdiction and the death occurred in another. 

 The terms '' malice " and " maliciously," used in the 

 statute, would have no meaning except by reference 

 to the common law. We know that tiie term " mal- 

 ice," in the definition of murder, does not require that 

 proof shall be given of any special hatred or ill-will to 

 the deceased, but that the deliberate intent to kill, 

 from whatever motive, constitutes all the malice that 

 the law requires to be shown, and that the term " with- 

 out malice" in the definition of manslaughter means 

 simply without premeditated intent, as where the kill- 

 ing occurs in the heat of passion or sudden quarrel. 

 Afl this I will explain to the jurv when it becomes 

 necessary to charge them. But tne instruction in 

 its use of the phrase " without malice in fact " might 

 convey the idea to the jury that if the killing was 

 done from the motives declared by the prisoner, and 

 if he had, as he says, no personal ill-will toward tbe 

 President, it was not murder. It is objectionable on 

 this ground, and every object that could be properly 

 sought under this heaa will be attained by the explana- 

 tions which I have indicated to be made to the jury. 

 It becomes important, in the first place, to settle the 

 rules of evidence by which the jury is to be guided in 

 weighing the proofs. 



In reference to the question on whom rests the bur- 

 den of proof where insanity is relied on as a defense, 

 three different and conflicting views have been held, 

 by three different courts. According to one view it is 

 incumbent on the accused to establish the fact of his 

 insanity at the tune of commission of the alleged crime 

 by evidence so conclusive as to exclude all reasonable 

 doubt of it. But this view derives so little support 

 from authority that it may be passed over without 

 comment as inadmissible. Another view is that the 

 defense of insanity is an affirmative one, which the 

 party asserting it must establish to the satisfaction of 

 the jury by at least a preponderance of evidence. 

 That is" to say, the evidence in favor of it need not be 

 so conclusive as to leave no room for reasonable doubt, 

 but it must have more weight with the jury than the 

 evidence against, so that they would feel justified in 

 finding the fact as they would find any fact in a civil 

 suit, in which all questions of fact are decided accord- 

 ing to the weight of the evidence. Still another view 

 is^hat the sanity of the accused is just as much a part 

 of the case of the prosecution as the homicide itself, 

 and just as much an element in the crime of murder, 

 the only difference being that as the law presumes 

 every one to be sane, it is not necessary for the Gov- 

 ernment to produce affirmative evidence of the sanity, 

 but that if the jury have a reasonable doubt of the 

 sanity they are just as much bound to acquit as if 

 they entertained a reasonable doubt of the commis- 

 sion of the homicide by the accused. After a careful 

 examination of the authorities, some of which are 

 mere dicta, and others not well considered or even 

 consistent statements of opinions, I am satisfied that 

 the best reasons and most weighty of them sustain the 

 views which I now proceed to state. I have examined 

 all the authorities with great care over and over again. 



