480 



LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. 



authorize the removal to the Federal courts of 

 cases involving crimes a:, r aiii>t State but not 

 I-Yileral laus, it was in violation of the sover- 

 eignty of i IK- Mali- and the Constitution of the 

 I'nitcd Stairs. 



The Supreme Court, by six of its nine jus- 

 tices, .In-tin-:. Clitlord and Field dissenting, 

 and Justice Hunt being absent, overruled these 

 objections, and held that the removal was au- 

 thorized l>y the act of Congress; that it was a 

 case within tlie jurisdiction of the Federal 

 courts, ami that Congress had, under the Con- 

 stitution, l he power which it had exercised. 

 The court further held that the act of Congress 

 authorizes the removal of any cause when the 

 acts of the defendant complained of were done, 

 or claimed to have been done, in the discharge 

 of his duty as a Federal officer. " That tlie act 

 of Congress," says the opinion, " does provide 

 for the removal of criminal prosecutions for 

 offenses against the State laws, when there 

 arises in them the claim of the Federal right or 

 authority, is too plain to admit of denial. Such 

 is its positive language, and it is not to be ar- 

 gued away by presenting the supposed incon- 

 gruity of administering State criminal laws by 

 other courts than those established by the 

 State. It has been strenuously urged that 

 murder within a State is not made a crime by 

 any act of Congress, and that it is an offense 

 against the peace and dignity of the State alone. 

 Hence it is inferred that its trial and punish- 

 ment can be conducted only in State tribunals, 

 and it is argued that the act of Congress can 

 not mean what it says, but that it must intend 

 only such prosecutions in State courts as are 

 for offenses against the United States offenses 

 against the revenue laws. But there can be no 

 criminal prosecutions initiated in any State 

 court for that which is merely an offense 

 against the General Government. If, there- 

 fore, the statute is allowed to mean anything, 

 when it speaks of criminal prosecutions in 

 State courts, it must mean that those are insti- 

 tuted for alleged violations of State laws in 

 which defenses are set up or claimed under 

 United States laws or authority." 



The authority of Congress to pass the act, 

 the court said, was found in that provision of 

 the Constitution which empowers Congress to 

 provide for carrying into effect all powers 

 granted by the Constitution. Among these 

 powers is the Federal judicial power, which 

 extends to " all cases in law and equity arising 

 under the Constitution, the laws of the United 

 States," etc. This provision, the court de- 

 clared, embraces alike civil and criminal cases 

 under the Constitution and Federal laws; and 

 criminal as well as civil cases may be removed 

 from a State to a Federal court whenever the 

 Federal authority is called in question. The 

 vast power of the General Government is set 

 forth by Justice Strong as follows : 



The United States is a government with authority 

 extending over the whole territory of the Union, act- 

 ing upon the States and upon the people of the States. 



While it is limited in the number of its powers, so far 

 as its sovereignty extends, it is supreme. No State 

 government can exclude it 1'roin the exercise of any 

 authority conferred upon it by tlie Constitution, ob- 

 .struet its authorized officers against its will, or with- 

 hold from it for a moment the cognizance of any sub- 

 ject which that instrument has committed to it. ... 

 The founders of the Constitution could never have 

 intended to leave to the possibly varying decisions of 

 the State courts what the laws of the government it 

 established are, what righto they confer, and what 

 protection shall be extended to those who execute 

 them. If they said, Where is the supremacy over 

 those questions vested in the Government by the Con- 

 stitution { if, whenever and wherever a case (irises 

 under the Constitution, and laws or treaties of the 

 United States, the national Government can not take 

 control of it, whether it be civil or criminal, in any 

 stage of its progress its judicial power is, ut least, 

 temporarily silenced instead of being at all times su- 

 preme. In criminal as well as in civil proceedings in 

 State courts, cases under the Constitution and laws of 

 the United States might have been expected to arise, 

 as, in fact, they do. Indeed, the powers of the Gen- 

 eral Government and the lawfulness of authority ex- 

 ercised or claimed under it, arc quite as frequently in 

 question in criminal cases in State courts as they are 

 in civil cases, in proportion to their number. 



From the decision of the majority Justices 

 Clifford and Field dissented, the former writ- 

 ing an elaborate opinion, in which the latter 

 concurred. Justice Clifford maintained that the 

 act of Congress in question did not authorize 

 the removal of a State indictment for an offense 

 against the laws of the State from the State to 

 the Federal courts for trial, and that, if it did, it 

 was unconstitutional and void. He held that 

 the Federal courts have no jurisdiction of a 

 criminal act which Congress has not made a 

 crime. "Decided cases everywhere hold,'' he 

 said, " that, unless Congress first defines the 

 offense, affixes the punishment, and declares, 

 in some way, the court that shall have juris- 

 diction of the accusation, the Circuit Court 

 can neither try the accused nor sentence him 

 to punishment. Even the power of Congress 

 to define offenses and provide for the punish- 

 ment of offenders is limited to such subjects 

 and circumstances as relate and are peculiar to 

 the Federal Government." He admitted that 

 .Congress might declare the killing of a revenue 

 officer, while in the discharge of his official 

 duties, even when done within a State, to be 

 murder, and might prescribe punishment for 

 the crime. In that case the Federal courts 

 would have jurisdiction of it. " But the prin- 

 cipal question in this case," he said, "is of a 

 very different character, as the indictment is 

 against the officer of the revenue for murder- 

 ing a citizen of the State, having in no way any 

 official connection with the collection of the 

 public revenue. Neither the Constitution nor 

 the acts of Congress give a revenue officer, or 

 any other officer of the United States, an im- 

 munity to commit murder in a State, or pro- 

 hibit the State from executing its laws for the 

 punishment of the offender. . . . Nobody be- 

 fore ever pretended that such an offense ever 

 was or could be defined by an act of Congress 

 as an offense against the Federal authority, or 



