NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES. 



617 



The umpire has been unable to find any indication 

 in either the agreement or in the correspondence that, 

 as contended by Spain, the commission ought to ex- 

 amine whether the requirements of the American law 

 of naturalization have been fulfilled. In such case the 

 umpire would have to examine, in the present case, 

 not only the question of five years' residence, but also 

 whether the declaration of intention made in 1850 was 

 legal or not ; whether it could be replaced by the dec- 

 laration of intention made by the claimant's father in 

 1824 ; whether the claimant resided one year in Mary- 

 land, where he was naturalized ; whether he conducted 

 himself as a man of good moral character ; whether he 

 was attached to the principles of the Constitution, etc. 

 It is not probable that, when the question was to de- 

 termine naturalization in good faith as against Spain, 

 either party intended an examination of these ques- 

 tions, because it seems entirely indifferent to Spain 

 whether the claimant abjured his allegiance only once 

 at the end of five years, or whether he made also a 

 similar oath two years previously ; whether, in case of 

 five years' residence, ho resided one year in Maryland, 

 or the whole time in other parts of the United States. 



In. his opinion in the Portuondo case, Baron 

 Blanc expressly concedes the authority of the 

 commission to inquire into the validity of a 

 naturalization certificate in case of fraud. He 

 decided that sufficient proof of citizenship was 

 given by the naturalization certificate of Portu- 

 ondo, "such certificate not being proved or 

 charged to have been procured by fraud, or 

 issued in violation of public law, treaties, or 

 natural justice." He then added that "such 

 grounds of impeachment, upon which any cer- 

 tificate of naturalization may be declared void, 

 are not found in this case." This opinion was 

 given by Baron Blanc, after the arbitrator on 

 the part of Spain, the Marquis de Potestad- 

 Fornari, had filed a protest against the views 

 expressed by Baron Blanc, in deciding the 

 Dominguez case, as above quoted. 



The position taken by Secretary Blaine with 

 reference to the powers and duties of the com- 

 mission, in the matter of naturalization cer- 

 tificates, is diametrically opposed to that taken 

 by his immediate predecessor, Mr. Evarts, who 

 assured the Spanish Minister in Washington, in 

 an official communication, dated March 4, 1880, 

 that the commission had full power to pass 

 upon all questions of law and fact arising in 

 the cases submitted, and that it was " beyond 

 the competence of either Government to in- 

 terfere with, direct, or obstruct its delibera- 

 tions." He expressly conceded that it might 

 inquire into the validity of any naturalization 

 certificate, and that the judgment of the um- 

 pire, whatever it might be, was final and not 

 open to review. His letter was written to 

 Sefior Don Felipe Mendez de Vigo, who, acting 

 under instructions from the Spanish Govern- 

 ment, had brought to the attention of the State 

 Department the protest made by the Marquis 

 de Potestad-Fornari, against the principles af- 

 firmed by Baron Blanc in the Dominguez case. 

 The views then held by the State Department 

 are set forth in the following passages of Mr. 

 Evarts's letter : 



I have no difficulty in cordially agreeing with you 

 in the principle which you deduce from the conven- 



tion of 1871 as the one which inspired both govern- 

 ments in their agreement to the terms of that instru- 

 ment, and to which you give expression in your note 

 in words which 1 willingly adopt : " From the terms 

 of the convention of 1871, it is clearly deduced that 

 the Government of the United States and that of Spain, 

 being both actuated by the strictest sentiment ot jus- 

 tice, knowing, perhaps, that the parties claiming to bo 

 American citizens had not all the necessary means of 

 defense before the Cuban courts, and that it was pos- 

 sible that abuses had existed in the issuance of certifi- 

 cates of naturalization presented by them, thought 

 proper in appointing the Spanish- American Commis- 

 sion of Arbitration to invest it with certain powers 

 which in certain cases place it above and beyond the 

 reach of decisions pronounced by the local courts of 

 both nations." 



It is precisely in this spirit that the Government of 

 the United States has interpreted, understood, and 

 accepted the functions and powers of the commission 

 created by the agreement of the two governments, and 

 organized in accordance with and in pursuance of the 

 convention of 1871. This Government has from the 

 first considered, as it now holds and feels itself bound 

 to maintain, that the commission thus established is 

 an independent iudicial tribunal, possessed of all the 

 powers and endowed with all the properties which 

 should distinguish a court of high international juris- 

 diction, alike competent in the jurisdiction conferred 

 upon it to bring under judgment the decisions of the 

 local courts of both nations and beyond the compe- 

 tence of either government to interfere with, direct, or 

 obstruct its deliberations. Viewing the commission 

 hi this lightj the Government of the United States, as 

 one of the high contracting parties to the convention, 

 and also as one of the parties to the contention sub- 

 mitted for the determination of the commission, has 

 felt itself bound, in accordance with the stipulations 

 of the seventh article of the agreement, to " accept 

 the awards made in the several cases submitted to the 

 said arbitration as final and conclusive." An exami- 

 nation of the proceedings of the commission, which I 

 have requested the advocate of the United States to 

 make, snows that in all cases submitted for its deter- 

 mination thus far the American claimants have been 

 required to establish their United States citizenship 

 by competent and sufficient proofs, and that in no case 

 has the right been denied to Spain to " traverse " the 

 allegation of such citizenship, and to support such de- 

 nial on the part of Spain by admissible evidence going 

 to show that the proofs, adduced in maintenance of 

 the claimants' demand to be considered citizens of 

 the United States, were on their face inadmissible, or 

 that they were unworthy of credit because of a taint 

 of fraud in tho proceedings of naturalization from 

 which the documents emanated, or that taken togeth- 

 er such proofs were insufficient to establish the demand 

 of American citizenship put forth by this Government 

 on behalf of tho claimant. All this it has been com- 

 petent to the representative of Spain to advance be- 

 fore the tribunal on behalf of his government as de- 

 fense and objection to each claim presented and sub- 

 mitted to the arbitration of the commission. 



In the proceedings with regard to the claim of Mr. 

 Fernando Doininzuez, from which the present con- 

 tention immediately arises, and in regard to which, in 

 the estimation of the Marquis de Potestad-Fornari. tho 

 decision of the umpire furnished sufficient grounds to 

 the arbitrator for Spain to refuse his concurrence with 

 the American arbitrator in a submission to the um- 

 pire of any future case involving a controverted ques- 

 tion of American naturalization upon which the arbi- 

 trators should disagree, this principle appears to have 

 been recognized by the commission in the most lib- 

 eral sense, and the inquiry as to tho question of the 

 citizenship of tho olnimant'was apparently pursued to 

 the utmost scope ami limit of judicial investifration. 



... It was the intention of the Government of the 

 United States, and I do not doubt that it was also tho 

 intention of the Government of his Catholic Majesty, 



